Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin\u27s Case (1608) by Price, Polly J
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 2
January 1997
Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's
Case (1608)
Polly J. Price
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608), 9 Yale J.L. & Human. (1997).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol9/iss1/2
Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship
in Calvin's Case (1608)
Polly J. Price*
I. INTRODUCTION
Great empires and humble nations alike have made similar choices
in determining who will be citizens. The world's nations emphasize
one or the other of only two methods for determining citizenship at
birth. Most nations assign citizenship at birth according to the
citizenship of at least one of the parents. A few nations, including the
United States, assign citizenship on the circumstance of place of
birth-within the territorial boundaries of the nation-regardless of
the citizenship of the parents. While the United States also permits
the children of its citizens born abroad to be considered U.S. citizens
from birth, the predominant mode of birthright citizenship in this
country, and the only one grounded in the Constitution,1 is that
which bestows citizenship upon anyone born on United States soil.
The roots of United States conceptions of birthright citizenship lie
deep in England's medieval past. This Article explores Calvin's Case
(1608)2 and the early modern common-law mind that first articulated
a theoretical basis for territorial birthright citizenship. Involving al
the important English judges of the day, Calvin's Case addressed the
question of whether persons born in Scotland, following the descent
of the English crown to the Scottish King James VI in 1603, would be
considered "subjects" in England. Calvin's Case determined that all
* Assistant Professor, Emory University School of Law. B.A., M.A. Emory University; J.D.
Harvard Law School. There are many to thank, but most notably Charles Donahue, Jr. of the
Harvard Law School, who provided valuable guidance at an early stage of this Article. Any
conclusions or errors, of course, remain my own.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside."). At least in this century, it has been presumed that the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that all persons born within the territorial boundaries of the
United States, including the children of illegal aliens, be granted citizenship.
2. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
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persons born within any territory held by the King of England were
to enjoy the benefits of English law as subjects of the King. A person
born within the King's dominion owed allegiance to the sovereign and
in turn was entitled to the King's protection.3 Calvin's Case is the
earliest, most influential theoretical articulation by an English court
of what came to be the common-law rule that a person's status was
vested at birth, and based upon place of birth. In the view of Sir
Edward Coke, one of the judges deciding Calvin's Case, the court's
determination was required by the divine law of nature, which was
"indeed ... the eternal law of the Creator 4 and "part of the law of
England."'
Coke's report of Calvin's Case was one of the most important
English common-law decisions adopted by courts in the early history
of the United States. Rules of citizenship derived from Calvin's Case
became the basis of the American common-law rule of birthright
citizenship,6 a rule that was later embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and which is now the subject of
heated political and legal debate. Remarkably, the rule of birthright
citizenship derived from Calvin's Case remained a status conferred by
the common law, as opposed to statutory or constitutional law, for
centuries. Until 1898 in the United States, and as late as 1949 in
Britain, there were still some cases in which the determination of
nationality depended upon the common-law rule of birth within a
territory.7
Only two years prior to Calvin's Case, the English King granted to
the colonists of Virginia a charter that guaranteed them the "rights"
of Englishmen: The colonists were to "have and enjoy all Liberties,
Franchises, and Immunities... to all Intents and Purposes, as if they
had been abiding and born, within this our Realm of England."8 In
3. See 77 Eng. Rep. at 409.
4. Id. at 391.
5. Id. at 392.
6. This was the view in the 19th century of Chancellor James Kent, and also of the U.S.
Supreme Court in several opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898); see also infra text accompanying notes 346-67. Though the scope of this Article does not
permit a thorough examination of the reception of Calvin's Case in the early United States, a
forthcoming article by the author will address this issue.
7. See 169 U.S. at 649 (declaring that because the Constitution does not define meaning of
words "citizen of the United States," except by declaration in 14th Amendment that "[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States," courts must resort to common-law rules of acquisition of
citizenship familiar to Framers). See generally CLIVE PARRY, BRITISH NATIONALITY: INCLUDING
CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED KINGDOM & COLONIES AND THE STATUS OF ALIENS (1951).
8. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 54 (1971)
(quoting VA. CHARTER) (emphasis added).
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Calvin's Case, by contrast, judges resolved the question of whether
persons in Scotland were by birth "subjects" of the English King by
turning to the common law rather than to charters or other royal
proclamations. Today, the determination of national status in most
parts of the world, as for the Virginia colonists in 1606, is a matter of
positive law-either statutory or constitutional. But Calvin's Case
began a three-century period in which the rule determining citizenship
in the English-speaking world, a rule based on place of birth, was self-
consciously the product of judicial decisions.
This Article is the first study to set the decision in Calvin's Case
within the broader context of continental legal and political thought
and to provide a sustained discussion of the natural law origins of
birthright citizenship in the common law. In particular, this Article
highlights the role of natural law in the decision in Calvin's Case, a
role that had far-reaching effects on the development of birthright
citizenship in the United States. James I's plans to unite Scotland and
England, following his inheritance of the crown of England in 1603,
sparked a wide-ranging search for a legal solution to the question of
which persons were entitled to the rights and entitlements of English
law. Lawyers, in both the civil- and common-law traditions, contribut-
ed to the substantial literature on uniting the laws of the two
kingdoms. The political debate preceding Calvin's Case searched for
examples of how other legal systems resolved the question of the
relationship of subjects within kingdoms united by descent.
This Article will also consider the political writings of Thomas Craig
and Jean Bodin to show that legal thinkers outside of England
provided solutions similar to that attained in Calvin's Case. For Craig,
the basis for determining status at birth was the jus feudale-Craig
arrived at this rule without reference to the English precedent that
Coke discussed in Calvin's Case.9 Coke, on the other hand, relied not
on a general jus feudale pre-dating or underlying English common law
but on natural law. Nonetheless, their conclusions were the same:
James's Scottish subjects born in Scotland after, but not before, he
ascended to the throne of England were to be considered subjects in
England as well.
Bodin's theories of sovereignty 0 suggest that he would probably
have shared Coke's view of the status of James's Scottish subjects in
9. THOMAS CRAIG, DE UNIONE REGNORUM BRITANNIAE TRACrATUS 339 (Charles Sanford
Terry trans., Scottish Historical Society 1909) (1605) [hereinafter CRAIG, DE UNIONE].
10. JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 175 (Kenneth McRae ed., Harv.
Univ. Press 1962) (Richard Knolles trans., 1st Eng. ed. 1606). Bodin's Republique was translated
as Commonwealth in 16th- and 17th-century England. In the references to follow, Bodin's
Republique will be cited to the English translation of 1606.
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England. For both Bodin and Coke, natural law or unwritten, funda-
mental law-law that was beyond the reach of the customary or
municipal law-determined who was a subject. Because the law of
nature was, by definition, the same in Scotland and in England,
differences in the municipal laws of the two countries were irrelevant.
In addition, Bodin's Republique, like Calvin's Case, emphasizes a
mutuality of obligation between the sovereign and the subject.
As suggested below, Craig's De Unione and Bodin's Republique
indicate that in 1608 political theorists and lawyers trained in both the
civil and common law could arrive at similar resolutions of the
problem in Calvin's Case without citing a single civil- or common-law
rule. Indeed, a unifying factor in Bodin's Republique, Craig's De
Unione, and Coke's report of Calvin's Case is that the duty of
allegiance that made one a subject, and that would unite all of the
King's subjects regardless of the existence of diverse laws within
separate kingdoms, was emphatically not a creation of positive law.
Although these works are from three different kingdoms and claim
three different sources of law, they share an underlying similarity of
political thought. This similarity leads one to pause when considering
Coke's claim that the justices in Calvin's Case consulted "no strange
histories, cited no foreign laws, [and] produced no alien precedents"
in reaching their decision." To accept this claim at face value is to
miss a critical confluence of ideas between legal thinkers of civil- and
00common-law backgrounds that would, in subsequent centuries,
further the establishment of the unique English rule of territorial
birthright citizenship."
11. 2 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 612 (Thomas Bayly Howell ed., London,
T.C. Hansard 1816) [hereinafter STATE TRIALS]; see also Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 381
(K.B. 1608).
12. This Article has by necessity avoided considering the role of Calvin's Case in some of
the related developments in the history of the period, most notably the constitutional crises to
come, including the beheading of the English King in 1649. However, in some respects, to
examine these topics would have been disappointing. Contrary to expectations raised by our
historical perceptions of later periods, in 1608 in Calvin's Case, Francis Bacon and Edward Coke
exhibited no personal antagonism toward each other, and, indeed, agreed on certain basic
propositions of sovereignty and English law. Cf. RICHARD HELGERSON, FORMS OF NATION-
HOOD: THE ELIZABETHIAN WRITING OF ENGLAND 73-74 (1992) (recounting Bacon's and
Coke's frequent clashes over royal prerogative and common law). Furthermore, Coke chooses
to hinge allegiance to the crown on the law of nature, not to the body politic, thereby avoiding
an opportunity to develop what we would view as a compact theory of sovereignty. Id. at 76.
And finally, Coke embraces wholeheartedly the crown's position on the status of the postnati;
only later would Coke become a great antagonist of the English monarchy. See generally
STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMON LAW,"
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The Jus Soli and the Jus Sanguinis
Before examining the issues in Calvin's Case, it is useful to have
some understanding of current methods for assigning citizenship or
nationality at birth. The territorial rule derived from Calvin's Case
rendered the status of British colonists different from that of colonists
of other European countries. Calvin's Case led to what is today
known in international law as the jus soli, the rule under which
nationality is acquired by the mere fact of birth within the territory of
a state.13 The other great rule for assigning nationality at birth, the
jus sanguinis, is identified with the civil law. It holds that, regardless
of the place of birth, nationality is acquired by descent following the
status of at least one parent (usually the father). 4 The United States,
Great Britain, and many Latin American countries traditionally have
favored the jus soli over the jus sanguinis as a rule for acquisition of
citizenship by birth.' 5 By contrast, the jus sanguinis has been the
favored rule in almost all European nations.16
No nation relies exclusively on one of these principles to determine
who is a natural-born subject or citizen."' In Britain, even before
Calvin's Case, various acts and proclamations provided that a child
born out of the territory of England could also be a natural-born
subject, as long as the child's parents owed allegiance to the sovereign
of England.' This is an example of the jus sanguinis operating
alongside the jus soli. In the history of both Britain and the United
States, the jus sanguinis has always been established by statute, never
13. See JOHN MERVYN JONES, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW 9-10 (1956); see also RUTH
DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-33 (2d ed. 1994).
14. See JONES, supra note 13, at 10; see also DONNER, supra note 13, at 31-33.
15. Great Britain abandoned the jus soli in 1981. In England, a newborn is now granted
citizenship at birth only if at least one parent is a citizen or permanently settled in Britain.
However, the child can acquire citizenship if one of the child's parents acquires citizenship while
the child is still a minor. British Nationality Act, 1981, ch. 61, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.). A related and
controversial issue in recent history has been the British treatment of persons born in Hong
Kong prior to the end of British sovereignty there. Persons born in Hong Kong under British
rule have been considered British subjects but without right of abode in Britain. See Mark F.
McElreath, Degrading Treatment From East Africa to Hong Kong: British Violations of Human
Rights, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 331, 336-41 (1991); Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong as an
International Legal Person, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 105 (1992).
16. See PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4,74,95-
96 (1979).
17. See ANN DUMMETr & ANDRES NICOL, SUBJECTS, CITIZENS, ALIENS AND OTHERS 7
(1990).
18. See, e.g., De Natis Ultra Mare, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2 (Eng.). The statute De natis ultra
mare permitted children to acquire subject status by birth according to descent, a classic example
of the jus sanguinis. Accordingly, territorial birth was not the only method to acquire natural-
born subject status in England, from at least as early as 1351.
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by judge-made law. 9 This fact underscores the uniqueness of the jus
soli as a feature or creation of the common law and suggests the
importance of Calvin's Case in the development of the rule.
Both the jus soli and the jus sanguinis are in the first instance
products of medieval law. However, the rule we refer to today as the
jus soli is emphasized in this Article because of its emergence as a
common-law "rule" and its unique influence in common-law
countries.2" Calvin's Case, as this Article will relate, was shaped by
the prevalent political theories of the time, including the belief in the
authority of divine law. In subsequent centuries, this common-law rule
of the jus soli itself changed in response to changing political exigen-
cies.
Given the present controversy in the United States over the status
and rights of both legal and illegal immigrants, this work of legal
history may have some contemporary relevance. A proposed constitu-
tional amendment to abolish birthright citizenship for the children of
illegal aliens is currently before Congress. Its advocates claim that
amendment is necessary to eliminate incentives for illegal immigra-
tion.2" The constitutional amendment would deny the children of
illegal aliens automatic U.S. citizenship by virtue of birth within one
of the fifty states. Instead, it would permit citizenship status only for
children who have at least one parent who is a citizen or legal
resident of the United States. Children of illegal aliens would retain
19. For example, in 1698 the British Parliament naturalized the children of subjects who
were born abroad while the parents were in the King's service. An Act to Naturalize the
Children of Such Officers and Soldiers, and Others the Natural-Born Subjects of This Realm,
Who Have Been Born During the War, the Parents of Such Children Having Been in the
Service of This Government, 1698, 10 Will. 4, ch. 20 (Eng.). A few years before, Parliament
passed an act to naturalize the children of royalists born abroad during the interregnum, An Act
for the Naturalizing of Children of His Majesty's English Subjects, Born in Foreign Countries
During the Late Troubles, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 6 (Eng.). See also British Nationality Act, 1981,
ch. 61, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.); DuMMETr & NICOL, supra note 17, at 37-38 (citing other acts of
Parliament). In the United States, in the Naturalization Act of 1790, Congress provided that "the
children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond the sea,... shall be
considered as natural born citizens .... " Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103
(repealed 1795). For contemporary law conferring citizenship at birth outside the territorial
United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(e), (g) (1995).
20. John W. Salmond concluded that "feudalism" created the rule of the jus soli and that
it substituted this rule for the jus sanguinis-the important contribution of "feudalism" as a
system of governance being that the status of "subject" was not hereditary. See John W.
Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance: Nationality in English Law, 18 LAW Q. REV. 49,53 (1902).
This theory is intriguing. Calvin's Case, however, suggests the "substitution" is more
complicated, but the topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
21. H.R.J. Res. 56, 104th Cong. (1995). Members of the House also proposed two bills that
would amend the Immigration and Naturalization Act to accomplish the same goals. H.R. 705,
104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1363, 104th Cong. (1995). As of this writing, all of the proposals were
pending before the House Judiciary Committee.
[Vol. 9: 73
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the citizenship of their parents.22 Testimony concerning the proposed
constitutional amendment before the House Judiciary Committee
pitted law professors from Yale and Columbia in a debate over the
historical origins and meaning of the citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.23 Although the proposed amendment did
not reach a floor vote during that legislative session, in late 1996 the
Republican Party established in its platform the goal of eliminating
birthright citizenship for children of illegal aliens. 24 A national
commentator likened the Republican move as a return to the era of
Dred Scott.2
5
In Calvin's Case, there are perhaps larger stories to be told, such as
the development of ideas of nationhood26 and the impending
constitutional crises between the English King and the Commons later
in the seventeenth century. These larger stories are themselves related
to concepts of allegiance and the role of natural law in determining
the obligations of subject and sovereign.27 This Article focuses more
narrowly upon the rule of status acquisition articulated in Calvin's
Case because the significance of natural law in the articulation of this
rule has not been emphasized in the history of birthright citizenship.
In addition, this examination furthers our understanding of the
development of common-law rules from a wider, comparative
perspective. While it may also help us to understand better the
22. See Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the United States to Illegal
Alien Parents: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims and the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, 1995 WL 13415440
(1995) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (statement of Rep. Anthony C. Beilenson (D-Cal.)).
23. Compare Joint Hearing, supra note 22, at 103, 1995 WL 13415441 (statement of Prof.
Gerald L. Neuman, Columbia University School of Law), with id. at 94, 1995 WL 13415487
(statement of Prof. Peter H. Shuck, Yale Law School). The two professors separately addressed
the question whether the rule of birthright citizenship established in the 14th Amendment could
be altered by Congress. Professor Shuck suggests that Congress could alter birthright citizenship.
See PETER H. SHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS
IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985). The more widely held view is that birthright citizenship can
only be altered by constitutional amendment. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 22, at 74, 1995
WL 13415481 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, Office of Legal
Counsel); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993). This Article does not revisit that particular debate; instead, this
inquiry looks further into the history of the rule at issue to consider, among other issues, its basis
in natural law theory of the early modern period.
24. See Robert Pear, Citizenship Proposal Faces Obstacle in the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1996, at A13.
25. See A.M. Rosenthal, Dred Scott in San Diego, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996, at A15.
26. See, e.g., HELGERSON, supra note 12 (1992).
27. See, e.g., Thomas Brown, The Case of Allegiance to a King in Possession; Dudley Diggs,
The Unlawfulness of Subjects Taking Up Arms Against Their Sovereign; William Sherlock, The
Case of the Allegiance Due to Sovereign Powers; and William Sherlock, A Vindication of the Case
of Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers, in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH HISTORY IN THE MODERN ERA
(David S. Berkowitz et al. eds., 1978).
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surprisingly dominant role of courts in fashioning the United States
rule of birthright citizenship, this Article will focus upon the earliest
stages of that development for the range of ideas and societal
influences within which the rule developed.
II. SUBJECTS AND ALIENS IN ENGLAND PRIOR TO 1608
A. Robert Calvin's Legal Problem
With the end of the Tudor dynasty following the death of Elizabeth
in 1603, James VI of Scotland inherited the throne of England as
James I, thereby uniting the two kingdoms in the "union of the
crowns."'  At once there was considerable debate concerning the
extent of union effected by the succession of the Scottish King to the
crown of England.29 James, however, considered a regal union alone
to be insufficient.3 ° Upon his arrival in England, James advocated a
closer unity between the laws, institutions, economies, and churches
of England and Scotland to protect and strengthen the Stuart dynas-
ty.3
1
In the early years of his reign, James himself led a sizable literary
effort advocating a closer union. 2 Of particular importance were the
discussions of naturalization contained in proposals to unite the laws
of the two countries, written by both common lawyers and civil
lawyers.3 3 Civil lawyers, also known as "civilians," were a relatively
28. As Brian Levack relates, the union of 1603 was limited in scope: "It was a strictly
dynastic, regal, and personal union, not an incorporating union of the two kingdoms." BRIAN
LEVACK, THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISH STATE, 1603-1707, at 1 (1987) [hereinafter LEVACK,
FORMATION]. Scotland and England were not united into one kingdom until the Treaty of
Union of 1707, which finally joined the two kingdoms into one body politic. Id. at 214.
29. See BRUCE GALLOWAY, THE UNION OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND, 1603-1608, at 1
(1986); JAMES H. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-1870, at 16
(1978).
30. In a speech to his first Parliament in March, 1604, James said, "I am the Husband and
the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife; I am the Head; and it is my Body; I am the Shepherd and it
is my flocke; I hope therefore no man will be so unreasonable as to think that I am a Christian
King under the Gospel should be a polygamist and husband to two wives; that I being the Head
should have a divided and monstrous Body." JOHN DUNCAN MACKIE, A HISTORY OF
SCOTLAND 187 (1984) (quoting James I).
31. See James I, Speech Before Parliament (Mar. 19, 1604), reprinted in THE POLITICAL
WORKS OF JAMES I 292 (Charles Mcllwain ed., 1918) [hereinafter WORKS OF JAMES I]; JOSEPH
ROBSON TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, A.D. 1603-1625,
at 24-30 (1930); see also LEVACK, FORMATION, supra note 28, at 2. At James's urging an Act
of 1604 appointed commissioners to consider various proposals for a "more perfect" union. See
TANNER at 23.
32. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 30-38; LEVACK, FORMATION, supra note 28, at 3.
33. See generally Brian Levack, The Proposed Union of English Law and Scots Law in the
Seventeenth Century, 20 JURID. REV. 97 (1975) [hereinafter Levack, Proposed Union]; Brian
Levack, English Law, Scots Law, and the Union, 1603-1707, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-
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small group of professionals who studied Roman law-the Corpus
Juris Civilis as systematized and interpreted in the twelfth and
succeeding centuries by scholars, notably the glossators and, later, the
post-glossators or commentators.34 Civilians had earned the degree
of Doctor of Civil Law at Oxford, Doctor of Laws at Cambridge, or
an equivalent degree at a continental university, and their professional
practice as lawyers was primarily in the ecclesiastical courts, the High
Court of Admiralty, and the High Court of Chivalry.35 Civil lawyers
in the early seventeenth century in England were closely identified
with crown interests because they relied on royal patronage for their
professional livelihood.36
The most pressing question of political debate soon became the
legal status of James's Scottish subjects in England. According to
English law, were Scots aliens or were they subjects, capable of
possessing and asserting at least some of the rights of English subjects,
including holding land and suing in English courts? These political
issues were fully debated in Parliament beginning in 1604, but the
matter was not settled there.37 Instead, the King's men "determined
to settle the point out of Parliament in the regular way, by resorting
to the English courts of justice."38
In 1607, two civil suits were initiated in the King's Bench and
Chancery over two estates in England conveyed to a Scottish child,
named as Robert "Calvin" in the pleadings, though evidence indicates
the child's true name was Robert "Colville."39 Robert was born in
Scotland after 1603, the year in which the English throne descended
to James. Robert's guardians, John and William Parkinson, initiated
the suits, claiming that Robert had been forcibly dispossessed of both
estates. The defendants in the King's Bench were Nicholas and
Robert Smith. Robert Calvin complained that the defendants
MAKERS IN BRITISH HISTORY 105 (Alan Harding ed., 1980).
34. The reception of the Corpus Juris Civilis and the work of the glossators and commen-
tators in the 12th and succeeding centuries has been amply described. See WINFRIED TRUSEN,
ANFANGE DES GELEHRTEN RECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND: EIN BEITRAG ZUR GESCHICHTE DER
FRUHREZEPTION (1962); see also BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND xxxvi
(Samuel E. Thorne ed. & trans., 1968).
35. See BRIAN LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND, 1603-1641, at 2-3 (1973).
36. Id. at 8, 43-49, 65.
37. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 559-76; see also Francis Bacon, A Speech... con-
cerning the Article of Naturalization, in 10 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 307-35 (James Sped-
ding et al. eds., Garrett Press 1968) (1868) [hereinafter WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON]; Harvey
Wheeler, Calvin's Case (1608) and the McIlwain-Schuyler Debate, 61 AM. HIST. REV. 587-88
(1956).
38. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 560. It is generally accepted that the suit was
contrived by the crown, and some contemporaries thought the judgment itself was rigged. See
GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 148-49.
39. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 148.
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"unjustly, and without judgment, have disseised him of his freehold
in Haggard" (Haggerston, parish of St. Leonard in Shoreditch). 4
One "Bingley" was the defendant in the Chancery case on a similar
writ concerning an estate in Bishopsgate, St. Buttolph's.4 1 The defen-
dants in both cases responded with a plea "in disability of Robert
Calvin's person" that the writs were inadmissible because Calvin was
an alien.42 Calvin was an alien, they argued, because he had been
born "within [James's] kingdom of Scotland, and out of the allegiance
of the said lord the King of his kingdom of England."43 If Calvin
were an alien, he would, according to English law, be unable to be
seised of a freehold in England.' The defendants' plea thus made
the status of persons born in Scotland after the accession of James I
to the throne of England the paramount legal issue.
The two cases were adjourned to the Exchequer Chamber to be
heard by all the King's Bench and Common Pleas justices as well as
the Lord Chancellor and barons of the Exchequer. In June 1608,
fourteen justices assembled for arguments in the case. Coke reports
that "the five judges of the King's Bench, who adjourned this case
into the Exchequer Chamber, rather adjourned it for weight than
difficulty."45  Serjeants Laurence Hyde and Richard Hutton
represented the defendants.4 6 James's own Solicitor General, Francis
Bacon, along with Attorney General Henry Hobart, argued the
plaintiff's position on behalf of the crown.47 All but two of the
justices determined that persons born in Scotland after the accession
of James to the throne of England (the postnati, as they were referred
to in the case) were to be regarded not as aliens in England but as
natural-born subjects, qualified to inherit English land.48 The postnati
as subjects born into the allegiance of James after he became King of
England owed their allegiance to the sovereign of England as well as
Scotland.49 By constrast, the antenati, those born before 1603, were
40. See Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 378 (K.B. 1608).
41. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 148.
42. See 77 Eng. Rep. at 379.
43. Id. at 380.
44. Id. at 405-06.
45. Id. at 410.
46. Id. at 379.
47. Id.; see also DANIEL R. COQUILLETrE, FRANCIS BACON 155 (1992).
48. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 560-61; see also Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377,
380-81 (K.B. 1608).
49. The kingdoms remained distinct until the Act of Union of 1707. There was never a union
of legal systems. The laws of the two kingdoms, categorized generally as a civil-law system in
Scotland and a common-law system in England, remain separate to this day. In fact, as
Chancellor Kent of New York noted in the early 19th century, England and Scotland recognized
the respective judgments of their courts under doctrines of international law and comity, in the
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born into the allegiance of a King with no relation to the English
throne. Therefore, unless the antenati were naturalized by statute,
these Scottish subjects of James remained aliens as a matter of
English law.5"
Several accounts of Calvin's Case were published,5' but by far the
most influential was that of Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the
Common Pleas. Coke's published reports were widely accessible to
lawyers of later ages, and Coke's report of Calvin's Case was the first
comprehensive statement in England of the law of naturalization.
Calvin's Case established a territorial rule for acquisition of subject
status at birth:
Every one born within the dominions of the King of England,
whether here or in his colonies or dependencies, being under the
protection of-therefore, according to our common law, owes
allegiance to-the King and is subject to all the duties and
entitled to enjoy all the rights and liberties of an Englishman. 2
Birth within the King's territory was not, however, the sole method
for acquiring subject status at birth. A rule derived from the statute
De Natis Ultra Mare of 1351 permitted children born abroad of
English parents to be considered natural-born subjects.53 But the rule
that presumed anyone born within the territory of the King to be a
natural-born subject of the King remained a part of English law until
1981. 5
For Coke, as this Article will show, the decision turned on the
allegiance owed by those born in the King's territories to their
sovereign's "natural body,"55 as opposed to his body politic. Coke
equated a subject's relationship to a King with other personal
same way that they treated judgments of other foreign nations. See 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 93-99 (New York, 0. Halsted 1827) (citing examples of marriages and divorces
as recognition of foreign judgments within domestic courts).
50. 77 Eng. Rep. at 399.
51. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 559.
52. HERBERT BROOM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VIEWED IN RELATION TO COMMON LAW
31 (London, W. Maxwell & Son, 2d ed. 1885).
53. De Natis Ultra Mare, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2 (Eng.); see also 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 87-89 (1926).
54. See British Nationality Act, 1981, ch. 61, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.); JONES, supra note 13. Prior to
1981, British law conferred subject status at birth within Great Britain unconditionally. See
British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 56, § 4 (Eng.); Naturalization Act, 1870, 33
Vict., ch. 14, § 4 (Eng.). The ancient common-law exceptions to this presumption at
birth-notably for the children of foreign diplomats and children of aliens born within English
territory while it might be under hostile occupation-were recognized in Calvin's Case, as
discussed below.
55. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 388-89, 391 (K.B. 1608). The medieval theory of the
King's two bodies, one "natural" and the other "political," is discussed in more detail in this
Article. See infra section II.
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relationships, such as master-servant and parent-child.56 The most
important constitutional aspect of the case is its support for the idea
that a King ruled by the law of nature, thereby requiring "natural"
allegiance of all subjects wherever they may be located. The case
emphasized the allegiance due to a sovereign solely by virtue of the
circumstances of birth; the inquiry was never concerned with
conscious choice of allegiance or membership in a corporate body.
The postnati, therefore, owed allegiance to a King who happened also
to be King of England, by virtue of their birth in Scotland after the
English crown descended to James. In effect, by determining that the
Scottish postnati were subjects in England, the decision established
that a merger of England and Scotland had taken place to some
degree at a political level, as well as through medieval dynastic law.57
Those historians who have considered the legal precedents for
Coke's opinion in the case generally maintain that the outcome was
inevitable." Indeed, most lawyers of the day agreed that the postnati,
at least, were de jure subjects at the time of James's proclamation of
union-well before Calvin's Case was brought before the English
justices. English lawyers had consistently held for some time that birth
within the kingdom, including territories held by an English King,
qualified one as a natural-born subject.59 Even lawyers for the defen-
dants in Calvin's Case admitted that the status of "subject" or "alien"
was determined by whether a person was born owing allegiance to the
King, as indicated by the Latin phrase ad fidem Regis.'
Coke also claimed continuity of the rule announced in Calvin's Case
with English legal precedent. Coke addressed two reasons why the
56. See LEVACK, FORMATION, supra note 28, at 183.
57. In a logical progression not fully understandable today, this fact accorded the postnati
certain rights within England available to English subjects, but it did not require that the two
bodies politic be merged into one commonwealth of laws. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 157;
David Martin Jones, Sir Edward Coke and the Interpretation of Lawful Allegiance in Seventeenth-
Century England, 7 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 321, 326-27 (1986).
58. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53, at 80; 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 441 (2d ed. 1911).
59. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 106 (noting that Sir Henry Spelman, who opposed
some parts of union plan, agreed on this point). At least one civilian in the year before Calvin's
Case also defined the English rule this way. John Cowell in The Interpreter (1607), defined
"alien" as "one born in a strange country .... A man born out of the land, so it be within the
limits of the King's obedience, beyond the seas, or of English parents, out of the King's
obedience (so the parents at the time of the birth, be of the King's allegiance) is no alien in
account, but a subject to the king." JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER: OR BOOK CONTAINING
THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS (Cambridge, John Legate 1607) (citing statute De Natis Ultra
Mare).
60. See Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 383, 388, 391 (K.B. 1608). As discussed below,
the Latin phrase "ad fidem Regis" as used by Coke suggests, in translation, "to [or toward or
for] the faith of the king."
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judges in Calvin's Case had consulted "no strange histories, cited no
foreign laws, [and] produced no alien precedents"6 in reaching their
decision:
[T]he one, for that the laws of England are so copious in this
point, as, God willing, by the report of this case shall appear; the
other, lest their arguments, concerning an alien born, should
become foreign, strange, and an alien to the state of the question,
which, being quaestio juris concerning freehold and inheritance
in England, is only to be decided by the laws of this realm.62
To view the outcome simply as inevitable, however, is to
misunderstand the political situation of the time, and to underestimate
the heavy hand of a rule thought to be compelled by the law of
nature. If, indeed, such compelling precedent existed that the King's
advocates readily instituted the suit in order to bypass Parliament
through a judicial determination of the matter,63 then the length and
complexity of both Coke's and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere's opinions
are puzzling. It seems this was not a case to which precedent easily
applied. Ellesmere thought the matter "to be rare... [and] of great
import and consequence."' Coke found "the weight and conse-
quence of the cause, both in praesenti et perpetuis futuris temporibus
justly deserved .... [It] was the longest and weightiest that ever was
argued in any Court., 61
In fact, as considered in the following sections, the legal
precedent-as that term was understood at the time-should have
been enough to resolve the question in favor of the postnati with little
debate. The problem the justices faced was not a lack of precedent
but an unsettled theory of sovereignty under which the question of
who is a subject and who is an alien had to be reconciled. The justices
were called upon to determine the essence of allegiance within the
theory of the King's two bodies-a theory argued by the defendants
in Calvin's Case as well as by those in the Commons who were
opposed to any closer union with Scotland.66 The theory of the
61. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 612.
62. Id.
63. Francis Bacon in his brief for the plaintiff asserted that the case was "used by His
Majesty to give an end to this question." 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 639.
64. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 659.
65. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 381 (K.B. 1608).
66. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 106; 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at
651, 665. The most complete history of this theory in English political thought is ERNST KAN-
TOROWICZ, THE KING'S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957).
Kantorowicz's work was pathbreaking, among other reasons, for noting that political and
religious authority in the early modem period often were so closely related as to be indistin-
guishable. The Church became the "corpus mysticum," and in a parallel development, political
1997]
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King's two bodies, an idea that had developed over centuries and was
firmly established under the influence of Tudor common lawyers,6 7
was a serious challenge to the received law of naturalization. This
challenge was met, in turn, with ideas not drawn entirely from English
common law. A closer examination of the theory of sovereignty
challenging the English customary law, and Coke's method of
resolving the issue in line with the past, reveal a significant expansion
of the dialogue concerning the nature of sovereignty and allegiance
over the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Partly as a result
of the unique challenge posed by the Stuart succession, continental
ideas of sovereignty and allegiance contributed to the resolution of
Calvin's Case, despite its apparent congruence with English law.
B. Terminology in 1608
Before considering the conceptual roots of Calvin's Case, it is useful
to summarize the basic categories used to describe a person's status
in early seventeenth-century England. Today, detailed categories of
"nationals" and "citizens" vary from country to country. In the United
States, for example, a "national of the United States" can be either
a citizen of the United States or a person who, though not a citizen
of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United
States. 68 For purposes of this Article, however, there are only five
recognized distinctions to be understood in the context of Calvin's
Case: "subject," "alien," "denizen," "natural-born subject," and
"naturalized subject."
In 1608 in England (and indeed in the law of Great Britain until the
mid-twentieth century),69 one was either a subject, an alien, or a
denizen. Subjects, in turn, were either "natural-born" or "naturalized."
A subject owed fealty or allegiance to a monarch, and the status was
derived from feudal conceptions of governance. 70 An alien, by
contrast, was not necessarily an enemy of the monarch, but was "one
born in a strange country. 71 An alien could become a denizen if he
were "enfranchised here in England by the Prince's charter, and en-
abled ... to do as the King's native subjects do: namely, to purchase,
and to possess lands, to be capable of any office or dignity."7" A
theories of the early modem period also incorporated the "corpus mysticum" of Christ to
explain the sovereignty in the body of the king. As a result, a parallel view of kingship related
to ideas of church governance by a mystical head prevailed throughout Europe at this time.
67. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 66, at 1-20.
68. United States Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1996).
69. See JONES, supra note 13, at 3.
70. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53, at 72.
71. See COWELL, supra note 59 (defining "alien").
72. Id. (defining "denizen").
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natural-born subject, as the name suggests, was a person who was
born into the King's allegiance, either by birth within England or by
birth within a territory held by the king.73 A naturalized subject was
similar to a denizen, but the former status could be conferred only by
act of Parliament,74 and sometimes by virtue of being a member of
a territory that had been conquered by the monarch of England,
71
although in 1608 the terms natural-born and naturalized appear to
have been used rather imprecisely.
76
Today, as a matter of international law, we are accustomed to think
of national status in terms of citizenship. The words "citizenship" and
"nationality" have similar meanings, although the overlap between the
two terms is not complete.77 As a matter of international law and
human rights, the link between political rights and nationality has
been described in the following terms:
It is generally accepted today that nationality is an inherent right
of all human beings. Not only is nationality the basic requirement
for the exercise of political rights, it also has an important
bearing on the individual's legal capacity. Thus, despite the fact
that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral and regulation
of nationality are matters for each State to decide, contemporary
developments indicate that international law does impose certain
limits on the broad powers enjoyed by the States in that area
78
In England, by contrast, the proper term for a British national
remains "subject." The term "citizen" was not used in English legal
discourse in 1608, and indeed in most of Europe "citizen" was not
used as a legal term outside of the Byzantine empire until well into
the early modern period.7 9 "Subject," in contrast to the "citizen" of
ancient Rome, was a legal relationship originating from feudal law
73. See KETrNER, supra note 29, at 13.
74. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *362. Coke in Calvin's Case described
the process of denization as requiring "letters patent" of the king---"for that the King by his
letters patent may make a denizen, but cannot naturalize him to all purposes, as an Act of
Parliament may do; neither can letters patent make any inheritable in this case, that by the
common law cannot inherit." Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 385 (K.B. 1608).
75. See KETTNER, supra note 29, at 23-24.
76. See, e.g., Francis Bacon, A Speech Concerning the Article of Naturalization, in 10 WORKS
OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 314.
77. See WEIS, supra note 16, at 4-5; see also RICHARD W. FLOURNOY, JR., & MANLEY 0.
HUDSON, A COLLECTION OF NATIONALITY LAWS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES AS CONTAINED IN
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND TREATIES vii (1983).
78. Quoted from the January 19, 1984, advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, reprinted in 5 HUM. RTs. L.J. 161, 167 (1984).
79. See DUMMETr & NICOL, supra note 17, at 9; PETER RIESENBERG, CITIZENSHIP IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION: PLATO TO ROUSSEAU 203-52 (1992).
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and politics.80 "Citizen" was the preferred term in the American
colonies after independence,8 probably derived from French uses of
the term and explained in part by the need of the colonists to distin-
guish membership in the new United States from their previous status
as subjects of the King of Britain.
In 1608, however, the status of "subject" did not carry with it a
defined sense of political membership or participation. Calvin's Case,
of course, predated both the Petition of Right of 162882 and the Bill
of Rights of 1689.83 In 1608, the status of subject was primarily a
duty, namely, the duty of allegiance. It did provide some rights,
however, including the right to hold land in the King's dominion and
to sue in the King's courts. The language of rights attaching to a
subject's status was used in both Scottish84 and continental political
and legal thought of the time. 5
Although not expressly using the term "rights" in Calvin's Case,
however, the judges clearly had specific legal entitlement in mind. For
Coke, the legal entitlement attaching to the status of subject included
"the King's legal protection," 86 the "ability to sue any action real or
personal,, 87 "protection and government due by the law of na-
80. See Salmond, supra note 20, at 49.
81. See 2 KENT, supra note 49, at 33-40, 39,42. Kent stated that the terms subject and citizen
were, "in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives; and though the term 'citizen' seems
to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other
countries, 'subjects,' for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government
and law of the land." 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258 (note) (New York,
Clayton & Van Norden, 3d ed. 1836).
82. See The Petition of Right, 1628 (Eng.), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF
THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1625-1660, at 66 (Samuel R. Gardiner ed., 3d ed. 1958). In this
document, drafted by Edward Coke and presented to Charles I, the English Parliament specified
some of the most important rights of Englishmen.
83. Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 123 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). James II's abuse of the
prerogative led to his abdication in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The event inspired the Bill
of Rights of 1689.
84. Thomas Craig, for example, wrote:
If any one supposes that any statute exists depriving Scotsmen of the power to enjoy the
same rights and privileges as the English, let him indicate the statute and the Parliament
by which it was passed .... What is permitted to one subject cannot be denied to the other,
and we Scotsmen demand nothing more than that we should be treated as fellow subjects.
CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 335-36.
85. Jean Bodin, for example, wrote:
It is then the acknowledgment and obedience of the free subject towards his sovereign
prince, and the tuition, justice, and defense of the prince towards the subject, which maketh
the citizen .... But the most notable privilege that the citizen has above the stranger, is,
that he had power to make his will, and to dispose of his goods, according to the customs.
BODIN, supra note 10, at 64-65.
86. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 393 (K.B. 1608). -
87. Id. at 393. Note, however, that at least some aliens could also sue in the King's courts.
The full quotation from which the above "right" of a subject is derived is as follows: "If a man
be attainted of felony or treason, he hath lost the King's legal protection, for he is thereby
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ture," a "union of protection of both kingdoms, equally belonging
to the subjects of either of them, 89 and capacity to inherit "any
lands in any of the said kingdoms."9 Lord Chancellor Ellesmere,
who also reported the decision of the Exchequer Chamber in Calvin's
Case (though his report was less well-known in subsequent centuries
than was Coke's report), stated that a subject "ought by reason and
law to have all the freedoms, privileges, and benefits pertaining to his
birth-right in all the King's dominions."" Though not yet precisely
delineated in English legal discourse, some of the "freedoms,
privileges and benefits" enjoyed by a subject included "that no man
may be deprived of his possessions, nor be placed in confinement,
until he have been duly summoned before and condemned by a lawful
tribunal."92 When used in this Article the association of rights with
the status of subject is to be understood in this limited sense.
C. Coke's View of Precedent
To appreciate better the problem raised by Calvin's Case, it is
necessary to understand both the state of the law of subjects and
aliens prior to 1608 and the judges' probable views concerning the
relationship of prior cases and statutes to the controversy in Calvin's
Case. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the judges
of the King's Bench and Common Pleas had begun to use the term
precedent when referring to prior, privately published judicial
decisions, as well as to statutes and charters.93 There was as of yet
no doctrine of precedent in the modern sense. Coke was perhaps the
first English judge to have used the term with frequency to refer to
the substantive result or rule laid down in a prior case that had some
factual similarity to the case at hand.94 Coke reported general
principles stated by the courts but with little factual comparison and
little distinction between what today is categorized as ratio decidendi
(the holding) versus obiter dictum (dictum). 9 In Calvin's Case, Coke
utterly disabled to sue any action real or personal (which is a greater disability than an alien in
league hath) ...." Id.
88. Id. at 394.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 405-06.
91. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 691.
92. See, e.g., CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 321. Craig, a Scottish lawyer trained in
the civil law, took this to be a fundamental principle of English common law (drawn, of course,
from the Magna Carta) that did not differ from the law of Scotland. Id.
93. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, The Genesis of Coke's Reports, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 190,212
(1942).
94. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103
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does not convey the sense that judges are bound by prior decisions.
Rather, precedents merely gave evidence of a legal principle or rule
that may or may not contribute to the resolution of a particular case.
Coke's use of the term "precedent" in Calvin's Case was purely to
stress continuity with the past-a desire to show consistency with
historical legal practices, but with no reciprocal view that historical
examples (whether cases, statutes, or custom) were controlling, nor
that the reasoning of any case was binding. In fact, some statutes
became part of the customary law of England because jurists viewed
them to be merely restatements or clarifications of the common law.
Coke, in particular, frequently took the earliest statutes to be what we
would view today as declaratory judgments--customary law that had
been "elaborated, summarized and enforced by statute. 9 6 On the
other hand, some of Coke's contemporaries, and perhaps Coke
himself, at times took the view of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere:
Some laws, as well statute law as common law, are obsolete and
worn out of use: for, all human laws are but leges temporis: and
the wisdom of the judges found them to be unmeet for the time
they lived in, although very good and necessary for the time
wherein they were made.97
In Calvin's Case, at least, Coke referred to "custom" more so than
"precedent," and custom is probably closer to what he meant by
precedent than our present-day notion of the term.98
96. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 261 (1987).
Pocock showed that notions of a higher law in the 17th century, frequently associated with the
"ancient constitution," were inseparable from the history and customs of feudalism. Pocock,
looking for the origins of English historical thought, focused on "the common-law mind" as a
peculiar mentality of 17th century common lawyers. Pocock regards the appeal to the "ancient
constitution" as an appeal to custom, not to immutable abstract political principles. On the
origins of the Whig theory of history, see id. at 228-32, 255-58 (discussing 17th-century English
theory that common law was validated by its sheer antiquity and that no presently ruling
monarch could trench on rights guaranteed by immemorial custom of realm). On contemporary
concerns for codification of customary and statutory law in the early 17th century, including the
views of Coke and Francis Bacon, see Barbara Shapiro, Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth
Century England, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 428.
97. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 674 (Lord Chancellor Ellesmere's report of
Calvin's Case).
98. Coke's report of Calvin's Case sheds more light on the then-contemporary use of the
word precedent:
Now are we come to the examples, resolutions, and judgments of former times; wherein
two things are to be observed, first, how many cases in our books do over-rule this case in
question, [and second] that for want of an express text of law in terminis terminantibus and
of examples and precedents in like cases (as was objected by some) we are driven to
determine the question by natural reason.
Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 399 (K.B. 1608). Yet Coke followed that statement with a
slightly different use of the word precedent: "There be multitudes of examples, precedents,
judgments, and resolutions in the laws of England, the true and unstrained reason whereof doth
decide this question." Id. at 400. Precedents, in this latter statement, were considered on par
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In 1605, Sir Thomas Craig, a Scottish lawyer trained in the civil law,
wrote about the working of precedent in English customary law. As
in Scotland, Craig wrote, judges of English common-law courts "give
the first place to the provisions of statutory or Parliament-made law,
provided the subject at issue is dealt with, permitted, or prohibited in
any statute .... [If] statute law offers nothing to instruct a judicial
decision, recourse is had in England to common law."99 This "com-
mon" or "customary" law, according to Craig, was the "system of law
the English kings at their coronation solemnly promise to respect as
unchangeable and inviolable.""t If neither statute nor common law
avail "to satisfy the judge,"' 0' then next in order of preference come
maxims, local custom, and finally "the precedents set by previous
judicial decisions.""0 2 Of these precedents, Craig wrote:
If no guidance can be obtained from custom, general axioms, or
prescription, then the precedents set by previous judicial
decisions in similar cases, and particularly in the Court of King's
Bench, must be followed, on which fresh cases when they arise
must be decided if the circumstances are similar. Against a
decision based on precedents there is no effective exception or
reply other than proof that the circumstances of the two cases
differ; and the smallest detail of difference frequently avails to
break down the alleged similarity of fact .... If one party to the
action can produce a case where the judgment supports his own
contention, the other argues with all his might that the cir-
cumstances of the case before the court are distinguishable from
those of the precedent quoted. It is left to the judge to
pronounce which is right, and to state the points of resemblance
or difference between the two cases.103
Craig based his conclusions on observation only, disclaiming any first-
hand experience with the English courts.1" Nonetheless, Craig
confirms the importance of statutes in the English courts, although his
view does not fully resonate with Coke's view that statutes may
with other "examples, judgements, and resolutions in the laws of England," including royal
charters and acts of Parliament.
99. CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 320-21.
100. Id. at 321. For Craig, the entire common law of England was probably customary law.
Craig most likely did not recognize a distinction between custom, in the sense of local common
law, and usage as a course of dealing generally adopted by persons, because Scots law did not
make the distinction between custom and usage as in English law of the period. See J.T.
Cameron, Custom as a Source of Law in Scotland, 27 MOD. L. REV. 306, 307, 312 (1964).
101. CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 323.
102. Id. at 325.
103. Id. at 325-26.
104. Id. at 304.
Price
19
Price: Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608)
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1997
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
themselves only embody or evidence the ancient, customary law of
England.
D. Precedent for the Problem of the Postnati
Returning to the legal precedent, or examples from England's
history, available to the judges in Calvin's Case, we know that as early
as the thirteenth century in a treatise by Henry de Bracton, °5
subject status was a corollary of allegiance. A subject's duty of al-
legiance to his King was much like the feudal vassal's duty of fealty
to his lord." Aliens, on the other hand, did not owe allegiance to
the King and accordingly had few rights, although an alien could
become a denizen, which meant that he had been "enfranchised here
in England by the Prince's charter, and enabled ... to do as the
King's native subjects do: namely, to purchase, and to possess lands,
to be capable of any office or dignity."' 7 The concept that a person
who owed fealty to another King could be "an alien by birth" is
clearly present. Bracton described an appropriate plea in defense of
an action for land, if the plaintiff were an alien:
[I]f he be an alien by birth who is of fealty to the King of France,
and he brings an action against some one who is of fealty to the
King of England, no answer shall be made to such a person at
least until the lands shall be common, nor even if the King has
allowed him to plead, because as an Englishman is not heard, if
he implead any one concerning lands and tenements in France,
so ought not a native of France and a born alien who is of fealty
to the King of France to be heard, if he impleads any one in
England."°
Thus a subject's duty of allegiance to the King was not a duty arising
from a relationship concerning a specific piece of land, but was
territorial in nature from an early period."
Moreover, the geographical boundaries of the English King's
territories were constantly changing throughout the medieval period,
and the rules determining subject status changed accordingly. During
105. HENRICI DE BRACrON, LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (Travers Twiss trans.
& ed., London, Longman & Co. 1878), cited in Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 383, 396 (K.B.
1608).
106. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53, at 72.
107. COWELL, supra note 59 (defining "denizen"). According to Bacon, the legal status of
denizen was granted by King's charter and was well recognized in the 15th and 16th centuries.
See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 648-49.
108. 6 BRACrON, supra note 105, at 375.
109. Some historians find evidence of this territorial basis as early as 1290 in the case of
Elyas de Rababyn, in which the rule was assumed to be that all persons born on English soil
were the King's subjects. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53,t 75 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 9: 73
20
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol9/iss1/2
1997]
the reign of Edward III, two fourteenth-century statutes established
fairly clear rules concerning the acquisition of the status of "subject
by birth." One, a statute of 1368, provided that persons born in any
of the King's territories were subjects in England."' The statute was
claimed to be based in judicial precedents which came from a time
when the King had large continental possessions."' The 1351 statute
De Natis Ultra Mare allowed children born outside of the King's
territories to inherit land as natural subjects if the parents were "of
the faith and ligeance of the King of England.' ' 1 2 The statute De
Natis established:
[Tihe law of the Crown of England is, and always hath been
such, that the children of the kings of England, in whatsoever
parts they be born ... be able and ought to bear the inheritance
after the death of their ancestors, [and that] all children in-
heritors, which from henceforth shall be born without the
ligeance of the king, whose fathers and mothers at the time of
their birth be and shall be ad fidem Regis [of the faith and
ligeance] of the King of England, shall have and enjoy the same
benefits and advantages ... as the other inheritors afore said in
113time to come ....
By at least the fourteenth century, then, birth in England was not the
exclusive avenue for acquiring the status of a natural-born subject. In
Calvin's Case, however, no statute specifically addressed the status of
James's Scottish subjects.
In the early sixteenth century, the rule was firmly developed that
aliens could not inherit land in England. In fact, one of the few
exceptions to the "olde custome of the realme" 4-that the eldest
son is the only heir to his father's estate-was that if a younger son
were a natural-born subject whose elder brother was born before the
act of denization, the younger would be the heir. Thus, in Doctor and
Student, Christopher St. German wrote: "Also if an alien have a son
that is an alien and after is made Denizen and hath another son, and
110. Children Born Beyond the Sea, if Inheritable in England, 1368, 42 Edw. 3, ch. 10
(Eng.); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53, at 76. Acquisition of the status of subject by birth was,
at least by the 17th century, explicitly limited to persons who were "freeborn." See Sir Edward
Coke, Speech Before Parliament (May 9, 1628), in 3 COMMONS DEBATES 1628, at 349 (Robert
C. Johnson et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter COMMONS DEBATES].
111. See 9 HOLDSwORTH, supra note 53, at 76; see also Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377,
403 (K.B. 1608).
112. De Natis Ultra Mare, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2 (Eng.); see also 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 53, at 75.
113. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53, at 75-76.
114. CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 49 (Theodore F.T. Plunknett &
J.L. Barton eds., 1974).
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after purchases lands and dies, the younger son shall inherit as heir
and not the eldest." ' The status of denizen, which could be con-
ferred by the King without act of Parliament, gave the person and his
heirs the right to acquire land and sue in the English courts, but it
had no retroactive operation.11 6 Coke later agreed with the charac-
terization of the status of a denizen described in Doctor and Student:
The difference between a naturalization and denization: by a
denization, which the King may grant of himself without a
Parliament, the party himself, and children born after, are made
capable of all rights and privileges as freeborn Englishmen; by a
naturalization those children which he had before are also
included. 17
Despite the fact that the civilian John Cowell's 1607 law dictionary,
The Interpreter, was condemned by James I in 1610 because it drew
its arguments "from the Imperial Laws of the Roman emperors,"118
there is little reason to doubt that Cowell's definition of the English
law concerning aliens was correct and widely held: An alien was "one
born in a strange country," but:
[A] man born out of the land, so it be within the limits of the
King's obedience, beyond the seas, or of English parents, out of
the King's obedience (so the parents at the time of the birth, be
of the King's allegiance) is no alien in account, but a subject to
the king. _
Further evidence that this formulation was generally accepted
before the time of Calvin's Case can be drawn from the fact that both
the plaintiff and the defendants cited Littleton, along with the statute
De Natis, for the rule: "Alien is he which is born out of the allegiance
of our lord the king."1" According to the defendants in Calvin's
Case, however, Robert Calvin was born into the allegiance not of the
King of England, but of the King of Scotland. For this reason, they
argued, the judges could not simply declare that under the common
law the postnati were subjects of England, though they might become
115. Id.
116. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53, at 77.
117. See Sir Edward Coke, Speech Before Parliament (May 9, 1628), in 3 COMMONS
DEBATES, supra note 110, at 349.
118. Daniel Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation I: The English Civilian Writers,
1523-1607, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (1981). Coquillette relates that a powerful group within the
House of Commons found Cowell's dictionary intolerable because it set forth a particularly
expansive jurisdiction for the Admiralty courts, dominated by civil lawyers. Id.
119. COWELL, supra note 59. One historian claims widespread agreement, during the
parliamentary debates preceding Calvin's Case, with the proposition that natural subject status
was not limited to birth within the kingdom of England. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 149.
120. 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 652, 665.
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denizens by charter, or they might become naturalized subjects by Act
of Parliament.
Ireland, Wales, Normandy, and Gascony, won and lost periodically
by English kings in previous centuries, provided other examples the
judges could consult. Persons born in Ireland after its conquest by
Henry II were considered natural-born subjects, "capable of and
inheritable to lands in England."'' Although originally assimilated
by conquest, thus differing from the situation of the union of the
crowns, subsequent English monarchs acquired the conquered
territories of Ireland through descent. Similarly, Wales, though soon
assimilated as part of the kingdom of England, was for a time (before
Edward I) held only as "parcel in tenure," and persons born in Wales
before Edward I were "capable and inheritable of lands in
England."' 2
Moreover, medieval English history provided two other examples
in which persons born in territories outside of England were not con-
sidered aliens in England. Like James I, Henry II acquired Gascony,
Guienne, and Anjou through "a title in blood and by descent," and
Edward III acquired the crown of France in like manner." The
praerogativa Regis of Edward II indicates that persons born in
Normandy while under the reign of the English King were to be
considered natural-born subjects.24 A statute from the reign of
Edward III indicated that "an exchange was made between an
Englishman and a Gascoin, of lands in England and in Gascoin; ergo,
the Gascoin was no alien, for then had he not been capable of lands
in England.""
These examples were not precisely parallel to James's situation, of
course. Henry II inherited Anjou from his father, then married
Eleanor of Aquitaine (Gascony, Guienne), and after that became
King of England. Further, although Edward III claimed the crown of
France, he cannot be said to have "acquired" it to quite the same
extent as Henry VI. Conspicuously absent in all of these precedents,
though, is any allusion to or discussion of a source of the rule in
divine law or the law of nature.
121. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 405 (K.B. 1608) (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 403 (citations omitted).
123. See id. at 403-05; 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 672-73 (discussing
status of persons in these territories).
124. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 571 (citation omitted); see also 77 Eng. Rep. at
401.
125. 77 Eng. Rep. at 401 (citation omitted).
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What was the legal status of Scots in England prior to the union of
the crowns? Thomas Craig, writing in 1605, described the situation in
this manner:
On the strictest grounds of equity I do not hesitate to say, that
for three or four centuries past we have been most unfairly
treated by our neighbors, who have regarded us as foreigners,
and have compelled us to be naturalized to qualify for the
enjoyment of English citizenship. [T]here is [now] no English law
or statute in which Scotsmen are debarred from title to or
possession of property validly acquired in England .... Are the
goods of Scotsmen who have acquired property in England by
inheritance, purchase, or exchange, or have died in England
testate or intestate, to be treated as the property of aliens and be
swept into the Exchequer as so much treasure trove? Our wise
King will never allow Scotsmen, his own kin, to be treated as
foreigners in his own dominions, to be liable to heavier burdens
than the English, or to be deprived of property which they have
acquired by marriage or some other equitable title."2
Craig shows us, again, that disposition of property was of primary
importance in the question behind the status of James's Scottish
subjects in England.
Before the English justices in the Exchequer Chamber decided
Robert Calvin's status, members of Parliament debated extensively
the status of the postnati1 27 The King's men proposed bills to
naturalize all of James's Scottish subjects, including the postnati, but
the bills failed to gain approval in Parliament."2 As a result, the
English rights of Scottish subjects were settled by the judges of the
realm. The parliamentary debates, the subject of the next section, are
important for an understanding of Calvin's Case because leaders of
the opposition in the Commons also represented Calvin's opponents
in the suit before the justices. Thus, one would expect that this
confrontation might provide clues to the formation of the defendants'
arguments in Calvin's Case. Another important point to be gleaned
from the debates concerns evidence that English lawyers and
lawmakers sought a resolution to the problem of the postnati from
continental legal practices.
126. CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 338-39.
127. For a summary of the parliamentary debates, see Le Case Del Union, Del Realm,
D'Escose, ove Angleterre, 72 Eng. Rep. 908 (n.d.); 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 559-76.
128. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 71-73, 117-19.
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III. THE LEGAL THEORY OF THE KING'S TWO BODIES
A. The Parliamentary Debates, 1606-1607
The Commissioners of Union,129 whose members included Francis
Bacon, Thomas Craig, and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, recommended
two bills to the Parliament in 1606.130 The first simply declared that
under existing law the postnati were de jure English subjects. The
second was a charter of naturalization for all Scots born before 1603,
the antenati.13 '
Both bills were defeated, after provoking substantial hostility in the
Commons. To those opposed to any closer union with the Scots, the
declaration concerning the postnati must have seemed to be the first
step toward James's "perfect union," cleverly implemented by
prerogative under the guise of the common law. In particular, there
was substantial opposition in both kingdoms to proposals for uniting
the laws of the two countries,132 and in a speech to the Commons in
support of the acts Bacon had referred to a possible union of laws:
[A]ccording to true reason of estate, Naturalization is in order
first and precedent to union of laws; in degree, a less matter than
union of laws; and in nature, separable, not inseparable, from
union of laws. For Naturalization doth but take out the marks of
a foreigner, but union of laws makes them entirely as oursel-
ves. 1
33
Opposition to the acts was also expressed with fears that an influx
of "hungry Scots" would flood England." Nicholas Fuller, a Puritan
129. The Commission, comprised of both civil and common lawyers, was established by Act
of Parliament to eliminate "hostile" laws between the two kingdoms. On the Commission
generally, see THE JACOBEAN UNION: Six TRACTS OF 1604, at xxii-xxiii (Bruce R. Galloway &
Brian P. Levack eds., 1985) [hereinafter JACOBEAN UNION].
130. See Le Case del Union, del Realm, D'Escose, ove Angleterre, 72 Eng. Rep. 908 (n.d.);
2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 562; see also 1 SAMUEL L. GARDINER, HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 326 (London, Longman, Green 1883).
131. See GARDINER, supra note 130, at 326; see also GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 74.
132. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 559-60; see also LEVACK, FORMATION, supra
note 28, at 85-87, 89; Levack, Proposed Union, supra note 33, at 100. Pamphlets and treatises
from civilian writers that argued the two kingdoms' laws were essentially similar and thus would
be easy to unite into one body of law were particularly objectionable to most common lawyers,
who generally perceived that Scotland had a civil-law system. Examples of these works include
JOHN COWELL, INST1TUTIONES JURIS ANGLICANI (London, John Legate 1605); ALBERICO
GENTILI, De Unione Regnorum Britanniae, in REGALES DISPUTATIONES TRES (London, apud
T. Vautrollericum 1605); JOHN HAYWARD, A TREATISE OF UNION OF THE TWO REALMES OF
ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND (London, F.K. for C.B. 1604).
133. See 10 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 314.
134. See GARDINER, supra note 130, at 331.
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agitator and recognized leader of those opposing an extension of the
privileges of English subjects to the Scots, thought that patronage
opportunities within England ought to be reserved only for English
subjects.135 Another Parliamentarian compared England to a rich
pasture threatened with a herd of famished cattle. 36
Five common lawyers, two of whom, Serjeants Richard Hutton and
Laurence Hyde, would continue to oppose the naturalization of the
postnati as counsel for the defendants in Calvin's Case,137 led the
legal attack on the proposition that the postnati were English subjects
as a matter of common law. From Bacon's and Coke's summaries of
the issues in Calvin's Case, it appears that the legal arguments made
by counsel for the defendants were substantially the same as those
presented in the debate over the Naturalization Act in the Com-
mons. 38 Because we do not have a complete report of the defen-
dants' arguments before the Exchequer Chamber, the legal debates
in Parliament over the Naturalization Act are all the more important.
The legal arguments that the postnati were aliens in England were
threefold. (1) Whoever is born out of the "ligeance" of King James
of his kingdom of England is an alien as to the kingdom of England,
applying equally to the postnati and the antenati. (2) Allegiance in
each kingdom is due to the King's body politic of that kingdom. The
allegiance due by a King's subject, therefore, is several and divided
between the two kingdoms. The allegiance due by Scots to James's
Scottish body politic does not establish that Scots are subjects of the
King in England. (3) A subject born out of the reach of the laws of
England cannot be a natural-born subject of the King in England and
take advantage of the protections or rights afforded by English law.
The defendants equated birth and jurisdiction on the question of
inheritance. They claimed that a subject who was not at the time and
in the place of his birth inheritable to the laws of England could not
be inheritable to the laws of England, even if he later owes allegiance
to a King who is also King of England.'39
Viewed from the parliamentary debates, the defendants in Calvin's
Case seem to have had two motives. One was a general opposition to
closer union with Scotland, and the other was parliamentary fear of
the legal theory of absolute monarchy prevalent in Europe at that
135. See 10 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 307.
136. See id. at 306.
137. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 561.
138. For a summary of the parliamentary debates, see 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at
561-76. See also Le Case del Union, del Realm, D'Escose, ove Angleterre, 72 Eng. Rep. 908
(n.d.).
139. The summary of the defendants' legal arguments is largely Broom's. See BROOM, supra
note 52, at 6-7.
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time and believed to be espoused by James IV4° The legal theory of
absolute monarchy posed a very real problem to the resolution of
Calvin's Case. In 1598, prior to his accession to the English throne,
James wrote in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies that because kings
derive their authority directly from God, not from laws enacted by a
Parliament, they were not subject to positive law.14 James derived
many of his ideas from Bodin, who himself was widely followed by
supporters of absolute monarchy in Europe in the late sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries.142 Bodin and James (at least in 1598)
both advocated that the absolute power of the monarch lies in the
King's right to give laws without the consent of his subjects, and thus,
the king, as a matter of natural law, was the final source of positive
law.1 43 James's English subjects may reasonably have feared that the
new King viewed the union of the crowns in 1603 to make all of
James's subjects, in England and Scotland, subject to one law-his.
According to Bacon, the thrust of the defendants' case was that the
allegiance required of a subject was allegiance to the "kingdom of
England," the King's other body, not to the person of the King.1"
The accepted ad fidem Regis formulation, however, clearly precluded
a limitation of this type. The defendants' challenge to the nature of
a subject's allegiance was a very complex idea involving corporate
governmental capacities attributed to the King's person. The strength
of the defendants' argument was that their resolution of the case did
not require past precedent to be contradicted or ignored.
The debates in the Commons over the Naturalization Act initially
challenged the applicability of the statute De Natis. Following the
Commissioners' proposals, leaders of the opposition in the Commons
selected persons trained in civil law as well as common lawyers to
present grounds for opposition to the Naturalization Act, with the
civilians to argue "the law of nations, and of reason, and the stories
of other countries, and the civil law elsewhere put in use upon un-
ions. 1 45 Sir Edwin Sandys considered the case "proper to be
140. An overview of the legal theory of absolute monarchy, discussed below, is provided in
Berman, supra note 94, at 1667-73. Many scholars, however, think that parliamentary fear of
absolute monarchy is exaggerated, and it is a major historiographic debate today. See, e.g.,
GLENN BURGESS, ABSOLUTE MONARCHY AND THE STUART CONSTITUTION (1994).
141. See WORKS OF JAMES I, supra note 31, at 53-54; see also Berman, supra note 94, at
1667.
142. See Berman, supra note 94, at 1668-69.
143. See id. at 1669-70.
144. See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 652.
145. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 563.
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consulted with the law of nations, which is called jus gentium; for
there being no precedent for it in the law.""
The civilians participating in the debates apparently did not discuss
any rule of citizenship claimed to derive from the post-classical texts
of Roman law that were glossed and commented upon in the West
from the late eleventh through the fifteenth centuries. 47 Nor did
any reference to ancient Roman practice appear in the arguments in
Calvin's Case,"4 except for a remark by Bacon that no "Roman
rule" was relevant to the question at hand: The judges had to decide
whether subjects "which grow unto the King by descent" were
naturalized, while Roman citizenship "did never follow by conquest,
during all the growth of the Roman empire; but was ever conferred
by charters or donations, sometimes to cities and towns, sometimes to
particular persons, and sometimes to nations, until the time of Adrian
the emperor, and the law In orbe Romano."'49
It appears that all of the participants understood that a rule of ac-
quisition of citizenship derived from the ancient law of
Rome-because it was conferred on persons in new territories by
"charters or donations"-was far removed from the question whether
the postnati of Scotland were de jure natural-born subjects according
to the customary laws of England.15 ° Coke was familiar with canon
law and Roman law. as applied in various types of cases in the English
ecclesiastical courts and royal prerogative courts, including the High
Court of Star Chamber, the High Court of Chivalry, the High Court
of Admiralty, and the Court of Requests. But he considered them to
be "foreign" bodies of law in the sense that they were particular
customs that had been incorporated into the common law, compared
to the common law traditionally applied in the courts of Common
146. Id. Presumably Sandys meant that there was no precedent from the common law of
England. Sandys opposed James's union plans in general and was a leader of the opposition to
the Naturalization Act. Perhaps, then, Sandys meant there was no favorable precedent for those
opposing the Act. See Theodore K. Rabb, Sir Edwin Sandys and the Parliament of 1604, 69 AM.
HIST. REV. 646 (1964).
147. On the transformation and contributions of classical Roman law texts to European law
generally, see Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Roman Law in Europe and the Jus Com-
mune, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1 (1994).
148. John Bennet may have made some reference to it when he said that the King had the
power under the "Civil Law" to naturalize subjects. Le Case del Union, del Realm, D'Escose,
ove Angleterre, 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 910 (n.d.).
149. See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 661. On the ancient Roman law
of citizenship, see John W. Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance, 17 LAW Q. REV 270 (1901).
150. Sir Thomas Craig, who was trained in the civil law in France, did not mention the
ancient Roman law of citizenship in his treatise on the union of England and Scotland, in which
he specifically addressed the status of James's Scottish subjects in England. Rather, Craig would
resolve the question according to the jus feudale, as discussed in Section V of this Article.
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Pleas, King's Bench, and Exchequer."'1 But even that law was not
exclusively English common law, as evidenced by Coke's frequent use
of maxims derived from the civil law.
152
The Earl of Northampton noted that the civil lawyers had suggested
little precedent to resolve the status of the postnati.'53 Thus, the
debate centered on the significance of the statute De Natis. Common
lawyers opposed to the Naturalization Act argued that allegiance
proceeded from the laws of England and not the person of the king,
citing language in De Natis referring to the "ligeance of England,"
which meant that allegiance was "tied to the kingdom, and not to the
person of the king."'" 4 James as King of Scotland received a dif-
ferent allegiance from his Scottish subjects than he did from his
English subjects as King of England, because James in essence
possessed two political bodies-"the person of the King possessing
both kingdoms possesseth the people and the laws of them distinct,
as the kingdoms are themselves." ' No one could be born "a
subject of two allegiances," and therefore Scots born in Scotland
could not be natural subjects in England.'56
In essence, these common lawyers attempted to limit allegiance to
the territory of England by considering the foundation for the
obligation of allegiance. Their contention was that allegiance was a
function of the laws of the kingdom, a positive law notion that in
some respects separated English common law from the crown. By
linking allegiance to the laws of England, the common lawyers
attempted to contradict the rule apparently settled since the reign of
Edward III that a person did not have to be born within the territory
of England to be a natural-born subject.
But their formulation fell easily before the language adfidem Regis
in the statute De Natis. The formulation ad fidem Regis meant that
151. See Berman, supra note 94, at 1679; Berman & Reid, supra note 147, at 8. Coke's par-
ticular hostility toward the Admiralty jurisdiction has been noted. See LEVACK, supra note 35,
at 78-79.
152. On the relationship between maxims and juristic rules derived from the civil law of
Rome, see PETER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS: FROM JURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL MAXIMS 153-79
(1966).
153. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 566. The civil lawyers, in general, believed that
the determination of a person's status by birth was a question of the "law of nations." See John
Doddridge, A Brief Consideration of the Union, in JACOBEAN UNION, supra note 129, at 142,
147.
154. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 567. They also argued that "lex et ligeancia came out
of one root, and as it is called lex a ligando, so it is called ligeance, a ligatione; which proveth
allegiance to be tied to laws." Id.
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allegiance was to the person of the King. 57 This, at least, was the
response of ten of eleven judges consulted on the question.158 Chief
Justice Popham, Sir Thomas Flemming, and Coke delivered opinions
to the Lords in Parliament determining that allegiance was to the
person of the King and not to the laws of England.159
Following the consultation with the judges, it was surely evident to
the opposition faction that the ad fidem Regis formulation excluded
arguments concerning allegiance other than to the King's person. It
is not surprising that Hutton and Hyde, as counsel for the defendants
in Calvin's Case, conformed their arguments accordingly. They
employed a combination of the ideas of the civilians and common
lawyers presented in the parliamentary debates. The civilians may
have suggested little precedent from the law of nations, as the Earl of
Northampton reported,"6 but the civil lawyers made a unique
contribution to the debate in the form of a maxim derived from the
Digest of Justinian.
B. A Maxim from the Civil Law
In the parliamentary debates, a civilian consulted on the matter, Sir
John Bennet,161 admitted that the civil law provided no resolution
to the problem of the status of the postnati, but for "other unions
lesser then kingdoms," Bennett said that the maxim "cum duo jura
concurrunt in una persona aequum est ac si essent in diversis" (when
two rights meet in one person, it is the same as if they were in
different persons) showed that "the customs of every place remain
still distinct and divided. '' 162 In contemporary law, there are
numerous examples of the principle embodied in the maxim cum duo
jura-one person may simultaneously exercise several distinct legal
capacities or functions.63 Bennet noted that the maxim was used to
157. Coke found legal ligeance in feudal oaths to the King recorded in Britton during the
rule of Edward t. See Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 385 (K.B. 1608). Coke maintained,
however, that legal allegiance was first a duty of allegiance to the person of the King by the law
of nature. Id. at 393-94.
158. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 560, 568, 576.
159. See id. at 568-70.
160. See id. at 566.
161. Bennet was a member of the Commons from 1597 to 1611, and his career as a civil
lawyer, including a place on the High Commission, required substantial royal patronage. See
LEVACK, supra note 35, at 209-10. Although Bennet concluded that the posmati were not
naturalized by operation of law, he "affirmed that it was in the power of the King by the Civil
Law to naturalize them, and give them the privileges." Le Case del Union, del Realm, D'Escose,
ove Angleterre, 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 910 (n.d.).
162. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 565.
163. For example, an executor of a will may also be a beneficiary. As another illustration
of this principle, while one person may serve on the board of directors of two or more different
corporations, the fact that one person holds the several directorships creates no relationship
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distinguish between two ecclesiastical entities joined under one
person, "as one parson of two churches, [or] one dean of two
deaneries."164 Since the customs of the two countries remained
divided after the union of the crowns, Bennet seemed to argue that
each entity bestowed separate rights upon its own subjects. Hence, the
postnati of Scotland had no better claim to natural-born subject status
in England than did the antenati.
In Calvin's Case the defendants argued that James had two distinct
capacities-his "body politic" and his natural body. Because there had
been no union of the laws of Scotland and the laws of England,
James's body politic remained different for each of his kingdoms.
Because allegiance was due to the King's body politic and not his
natural body, the defendants argued that the plaintiff owed allegiance
to James's Scottish body politic but not to James's English body
politic. That the two kingdoms (and their laws) remained distinct
within James's political capacities was shown by reference to the
maxim Bennet discussed in the parliamentary debates, "Quando duo
jura concurrunt in una persona, aequum est acessent in diversis.'65
The defendants argued the maxim established that parishioners in two
parishes under one bishop did not thereby become related to each
other.' 66 Ellesmere denied the distinction between James's capacities
and characterized the defendants' case differently: "The subjects of
each several kingdom are bound to him by distinct allegiance,
according to the several laws of the kingdom where they were born.
And all this is grounded upon this rule of fiction in Law: Quando duo
jura .... 167
The maxim cum duo jura was critical to the defendants' character-
ization of ad fidem Regis and therefore to their resistance to the legal
theory of absolute monarchy. By contending that ad fidem Regis
meant allegiance to the political aspect of the King's body, the
defendants' position fit within the accepted rule of territorial birth
while maintaining that this allegiance was required by the customary
laws of England.1" The King might very well have two capacities,
as English law had recognized for several centuries,169 but because
the English and Scottish bodies politic remained distinct, the adfidem
whatsoever between the corporations. They remain legally quite distinct.
164. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 565.
165. See Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 380 (K.B. 1608).
166. See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 657.
167. See Louis KNAFLA, LAW AND POLITICS IN JACOBEAN ENGLAND: THE TRACTS OF
LORD CHANCELLOR ELLESMERE 240 (1977).
168. See id.
169. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 66, at 1-3.
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Regis test worked to deny subject status in England to the postnati of
Scotland.
Bennet's introduction of the maxim into the parliamentary debate
on naturalization was not its first appearance in English legal
discourse. The maxim was used in an ecclesiastical context a few years
earlier in Acton's Case.17° There the question was whether a statute
of Henry VII" t forbidding a cleric from holding a plurality of
benefices prohibited two chaplains of a widowed baroness from
acquiring additional benefices upon her marriage to another
nobleman.
In Acton's Case the chaplains had argued that their holdings did not
exceed any statutory limit because the Act did not apply to rights
retained in elevation of status: "If a bishop is translated to an
archbishopric, or a baron is created an earl, now he has both these
dignities, and as it is commonly said, Quando duo jura concurrunt in
una persona, aequum est ac si essent in diversis."1 72 Coke's answer,
in Acton's Case, was that the maxim was not contrary to the Act:
"[B]ut yet within this Act he can have but as many as an archbishop,
or an earl may have; for although he has sundry dignities, yet he is
but one and the same person to whom the attendance and service
shall be done .... ,,73 Therefore, the two chaplains could retain the
benefices granted them by the baroness prior to her remarriage, and
they could take additional benefices resulting from her marriage to
another noble.
Coke subsequently considered the maxim in Calvin's Case.74 The
maxim's use in Calvin's Case provides an example of an English court
directly borrowing a maxim from the civil law and converting it to an
entirely different use. The maxim appears in several late medieval
collections of Brocardica iuris, collections of maxims compiled by the
scholars who glossed the Corpus Juris Civilis, 175 and is cited there
to the Digest of Justinian.176 Bartolus derived the maxim in essential-
170. Acton's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1108, Y.B. 45 Eliz., Hil. 20 (C.P. n.d.).
171. Spiritual Persons Abridged from Having Pluralities of Livings, and from Taking of
Ferms, 1529, 21 Hen. 8, ch. 13 (Eng.).
172. 76 Eng. Rep. at 1108.
173. Id.
174. See Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 380, 394 (K.B. 1608).
175. For a thorough study of the introduction of regulae iuris and the relationship to maxims
used in English courts, see STEIN, supra note 152.
176. See BROCARDICA IURIS (Paris, Etienne Jehannot for Denis Roce ca. 1495) (available
at Harvard Law School Special Collections); BROCARDICA IURIS (Paris, Etienne Jehannot for
Durand Gerlier ca. 1499) (available at Harvard Law School Special Collections); MODUS
LEGENDI ABBREVIATURAS 155a (Cologne, apud Petrum Horst 1577) (available at Harvard Law
School Special Collections). In all of these collections the citation is to DIG. 34.9.22
(Tryphoninus, Libro Quinto Disputationum).
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ly the form used by Bennet from a case concerning challenges to a
will by a minor's guardian when the guardian stood to gain from the
will in another capacity.177 Bennet, however, used the maxim in the
very different context of ecclesiastical pluralities: "[A]s one Parson of
two Churches, one Dean of two Deaneries; the Customes of every
place remain still distinct and divided. 1' 78 The subsequent use of the
maxim in English customary law, and in Calvin's Case in particular,
illustrates how "much of medieval canon law passed over-often un-
noticed-into the law of the state.
1 79
C. The Debate Moves to the Courtroom
The arguments presented to the Exchequer Chamber in Calvin's
Case echoed the parliamentary debates of the preceding year. With
the understanding that subject status acquired by birth prior to 1608
was not limited to the territorial boundaries of England, Bacon
argued that Cobledike's Caset"° also provided support for the propo-
sition that the postnati of Scotland were natural subjects in England.
In the reign of Edward I, Constance de N. swore out a writ against
Roger de Cobledike, claiming that a freehold held by Cobledike had
descended to her as rightful heir.181 In defense, Cobledike argued
that the plaintiff was a "French woman, and not of the ligeance, nor
of the faith of England," and demanded judgment. Cobledike's ar-
177. "Qui ex necessitate officii testamentum accusat, ab eo quod propuo nomine meriut, non
repellitur: Item quando plura iura concurrunt in persona unus, perunde est, ac si concurrent in
persona diversorum." ("He who by necessity of office challenges a testament is not repelled from
that which he has received in his own name. Similarly, when several rights concur in one person,
it is the same as when rights concur in several persons."). 4 BARTOLUS DE SAXOFERRATO,
OMNIA, QUAE EXTANT, OPERA at fol. 106ra (Venice, apud luntas 1602) (commentary to DIG.
34.9.22 (Tryphoninus, Libro Quinto Disputationum)). The point of this passage is that someone
who has an official responsibility to challenge a will is not disqualified from taking under its
terms.
178. Le Case del Union, del Realm, D'Escose, ove Angleterre, 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 910 (n.d.).
There is some early precedent for the ecclesiastical use of the maxim: CODE JUST. 6.35.2
(Severus & Antoninus 208) encompasses issues parallel to DIG. 34.9.22 (Tryphoninus, Libro
Quinto Disputationum), and the GLOSSA ORDINARIA (ca. 1240) alleges that this rule also
answers a canon-law problem about benefices.
179. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND
RELIGION 45 (1993). There is a large scholarly literature, much of it by Richard Helmholz, on
the ways in which civil and canon law had a bearing on the history of English law. See, e.g.,
RICHARD HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1987); Richard Helmholz,
Continental Law and Common Law: Historical Strangers or Companions?, 1990 DUKE L. J. 1207;
Richard Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European
Jus Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990).
180. Coke's citation of Cobledike's Case, see Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 388 (K.B.
1608), refers to a case from the time of Edward I, in Hengham's reports, which at that time were
"written in parchment, in an ancient hand." Id.
181. See id.; 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53, at 77.
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gument that the opposing party was "not of the ligeance and faith of
England" was held insufficient because it "referred ligeance and faith
to England, and not to the king." 1" The plea was amended (and
later accepted) to state that the plaintiff was "not of the ligeance of
England nor of the faith of the king."183 This plea suggests that a
King's subject in another territory was not an alien in England, but
that Constance did not qualify as a subject of the King. Like the
statute De Natis, the allegiance was ad fidem Regis, or "to the faith of
the king," strengthening the argument that allegiance was a personal
tie between the subject and the King's natural body instead of to the
kingdom of England."l
Bacon also noted the several examples from English history in
which the King's subjects in other territories were not considered
aliens in England. 5 Bacon found evidence in the praerogativa Regis
that persons born in territories subject to the King but not in England
were natural-born subjects,186 and, citing Bracton, claimed this status
was not altered by a loss of the province due to a change in
sovereignty, as consistent practice would require."8 7
Ellesmere agreed with Bacon's characterization of the rule
concerning aliens:
[For where there is but one sovereign, all his subjects born in all
his Dominions be born Adfidem Regis; and are bound to him by
one bond of Faith and Allegiance: And in that, one is not greater
nor lesser than another; nor one to be preferred before another:
but all to be obedient alike; and to be ruled alike; yet under
several laws and customs .... And therefore all that have been
born in any of the King's Dominions since he was King of
England are capable and inheritable in all his Dominions without
exceptions. lss
Coke, too, had little trouble with the formulation of the rule to be
applied:
182. 77 Eng. Rep. at 388.
183. Id.
184. Ellesmere, too, thought Cobledike's Case to establish this point. See 2 STATE TRIALS,
supra note 11, at 688.
185. See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 672-73; Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng.
Rep. 377, 403-05 (K.B. 1608).
186. See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 675 (internal quotes omitted)
(citation omitted); 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 571 (citing same).
187. See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 675 (citation omitted). Bacon
noted that Parliament could always change this result by statute, "for we can make an act of
Parliament of separation if we like not their consort." Id. at 659.
188. KNAFLA, supra note 167, at 237.
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An alien is a subject that is born out of the ligeance of the king,
and under the ligeance of another; and can have no real or
personal action for or concerning land: but in every such action
the tenant or defendant may plead that he was born in such a
country which is not within the ligeance of the king.ts9
Coke further noted, and Ellesmere agreed,"g that Cobledike's Case
"did overrule this case of Calvin, in the very point now in question;
for that the plea in this case doth not refer faith or ligeance to the
King indefinitely and generally, but limiteth and restraineth faith and
ligeance to the kingdom." 19 Thus, according to Coke, it was not a
bar to the plaintiff's action that Scotland had a separate Parliament
and laws and remained a distinct kingdom within the union of the
crowns.
Despite the precedent of recognizing, albeit through statute, the
subject status of persons in the French possessions of Henry II and
Edward III, 9 and the general agreement that one was not an alien
according to English law if birth were ad fidem Regis,93 Coke could
not easily rule in favor of the plaintiff. While not challenging the rule
derived from the statute De Natis, counsel for the defendants argued
that the necessary allegiance for birth ad fidem Regis was to the
King's body politic and the laws of England. They argued that the
postnati could not be considered naturalized subjects with respect to
the laws of England because they were not subject to the territorial
reach of laws enacted by the English Parliament. It was not sufficient
that the postnati of Scotland happened to owe allegiance to a King
who was also England's monarch.
Bacon argued that legal precedent, as that word was understood at
the time, permitted the assembled judges of the realm simply to
declare that the postnati were subjects in England. This argument
posed a problem in Calvin's Case because the English legal concept
of sovereignty had changed substantially since the fourteenth century
when most of the applicable law of naturalization had developed. This
development in the notion of sovereignty took the form of the theory
189. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 396 (K.B. 1608). Coke cites Littleton for this rule:
"Alienigena est alienae gentis seu alienae ligeantiae, qui etiam dicitur peregrinus, alienus, exoticus,
extraneus .... Extraneus est subditus, qui extra terrain, i.e. potestatem Regis natus est." Id. ("An
alien-born is someone of a foreign race or foreign lineage, who is also called 'foreigner,'
'alien,' an 'exotic,' or an 'outsider' (extraneus). The outsider is a subject who was born
outside the realm, that is, outside the power of the king.").
190. See KNAFLA, supra note 167, at 241-42.
191. 77 Eng. Rep. at 388.
192. See id. at 402-04.
193. See id., at 383, 388, 391 (K.B. 1608); 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at
665 (quoting statute De Natis).
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of "the King's two bodies," a conception not entirely new to English
political thought but one that had undergone substantial development
at the hands of Tudor common lawyers. In essence, the theory
addressed the problem of continuity necessary for perpetuating
hereditary kingdoms; namely, what happened to sovereignty upon the
King's death. English jurists held that the body politic survived death
and was transferred immediately to another body natural according
to the laws of succession. No coronation was necessary to bestow the
sovereignty of the body politic upon the new monarch. 94 The legal
fiction of the King's two bodies had been used in English political
thought for some time, but it took on very distinctive characteristics
in the late Tudor and early Stuart periods.95 The theory of "the
King's two bodies" was applied for the first time to the law of subejcts
and aliens in Calvin's Case.
D. Francis Bacon's Proposal: The Law of Nature
Bacon, as counsel for the plaintiff, disagreed with the proposition
that allegiance must be either to the King's body politic or his body
natural. Bacon argued that while the King might have a body politic
for some purposes-to resolve questions of the validity of a prince's
acts before ascending the throne as sovereign 96 the common law
of England had always held that the two were inseparable. Bacon
quoted from Plowden: "There is in the King not a body natural alone,
nor a body politic alone, but a body natural and politic together:
Corpus corporatum in corpore naturali, et corpus naturale in corpore
corporato."'' (The corporate body subsists in a natural body, and
the natural body in a corporate body.) Bacon denied that the cum
duo jura maxim held otherwise, and denied that the maxim was
applicable to English common law:
It is a rule of the civil law, say they... when two rights do meet
in one person, there is no confusion of them, but they remain still
in the eye of law distinct, as if they were in several persons: and
194. See 77 Eng. Rep. at 388-89; KANTOROWICZ, supra note 66, at 13.
195. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 66, at 1-6.
196. See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 667.
197. Id. at 667. Bacon's principal disagreement with the defendants' distinction in the King's
two natures was that the body politic would "swallow up" the body natural. Bacon explained
that the King's body politic was not a pure "corporation":
[L]et us see what operations the King's natural person hath upon his crown and body
politic: of which the chiefest and greatest is, that it causeth the crown to go by descent;
which is a thing strange and contrary to the course of all corporations, which evermore take
in succession and not by descent.
Id. at 668. Thus, Bacon relied upon "the law of reason" (e.g., "a corporation can have no wife"),
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they bring examples of it of one man bishop of two
sees .... [B]ut [this rule] receiveth no forced or coined but a
true and sound distinction or limitation, which is, that it ever-
more faileth and deceiveth in cases where there is any vigor or
operation of the natural person.'98
Bacon made no further reference to this maxim, nor did he explain
on what ground it was inapplicable. Rejecting the idea that allegiance
was to the King's body politic, however, did not avoid the defendants'
additional claim that allegiance was due by the laws of England. 99
Allegiance might be to the King's natural body, but if this allegiance
were a function of the laws of James's separate bodies politic, Robert
Calvin would still be an alien in England.
Bacon's answer was that allegiance was due not by the law of either
England or Scotland alone but by the law of nature, itself a part of
the law of England, as it was part of the laws of all nations:
Law no doubt is the great organ by which the sovereign power
doth move, and may be truly compared to the sinews in a natural
body.... But towards the King himself the law doth a double
office or operation: the first is to entitle the king, or design
him .... The second is... to make the ordinary power of the
King more definite or regular.... But I demand, do these offices
or operations of law evacuate or frustrate the original submission,
which was natural? Or shall it be said that all allegiance is by
law? No more than it can be said, that potestas patria, the power
of the father over the child, is by law. And yet no doubt laws do
diversely define of that also; the law of some nations having
given the fathers power to put their children to death; others, to
sell them thrice .... Yet no man will affirm, that the obedience
of the child is by law, though laws in some points do make it
more positive: and even so it is of allegiance of subjects to
hereditary monarchs, which is corroborated and confirmed by
law, but is the work of the law of nature.2"
In support of the claim that allegiance was due to a sovereign by the
law of nature, Bacon offered "divers acts of Parliaments" that titled
the King "our natural sovereign and liege lord."' Further, accor-
ding to Bacon, "allegiance began before laws": "The original age of
kingdoms was governed by natural equity .... [K]ings were more
ancient than lawgivers [and] the first submissions were simple
198. Id. at 657.
199. See Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 380, 389, 391 (K.B. 1608).
200. 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 646-47.
201. Id. at 647. Bacon did not specify particular acts, although Broom has suggested some
possibilities. See BROOM, supra note 52, at 9 n.2.
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.... ,,202 Bacon's arguments are particularly noteworthy because
they strongly resonate with Bodin's writings concerning the source of
the obligation of allegiance.2' Bacon's analogy of the source of the
duty of allegiance in the law of nature, similar to the operation of
natural law within families, also appears in Bodin's Republique. 
20
An additional step remained. In order to find that the allegiance
due by the law of nature to the King's natural body meant that
James's Scottish and English subjects were mutually naturalized,
Bacon argued:
For, my lords, by the law of nature all men in the world are
naturalized one towards another.... It was civil and national
laws that brought in these words, and differences, of civis and
exterus, alien and native. And therefore because they tend to
abridge the law of nature, the law favoureth not them, but takes
them strictly .... So by the same reason, all national laws
whatsoever are to be taken strictly and hardly in any oint
wherein they abridge and derogate from the law of nature.
Bacon offered no further proof that natural law required this result.
Perhaps the paucity of evidence reveals a difficulty in refuting the
defendants' two-body theory of allegiance and overcoming the
prevailing notion that the nerves of England's body politic-an idea
favoring a positive law of allegiance-should determine the status of
the postnati.
Bennet's maxim, first introduced in the parliamentary debates, was
used later by the defendants in Calvin's Case to support the distinc-
tion between the King's two bodies. This indicates some interaction
between the civilians and common lawyers opposing the
Naturalization Act.' For the plaintiff, Francis Bacon cited the
maxim and noted that "the words whereof are taken from the civil
law; but the matter of it is received in all laws; being a very line or
rule of reason, to avoid confusion. ' ' 07
202. 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 666.
203. See BODIN, supra note 10, at 67-68, 84-86, 114-15, 153, 156, 159-60, 218-19.
204. See id. at 8, 10-11.
205. 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 664.
206. More civil lawyers apparently supported James's union plans than opposed, most likely
because they placed their hopes of political advancement in the crown in an age of jurisdictional
challenge from the King's Bench and Common Pleas. See LEVACK, supra note 35, at 2-5. It is
difficult to determine the number of civilians opposing the Naturalization Act because Moore's
report does not specify who they were, other than to note that the rule proposed by Bennet
supported the opposition in the Commons. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 566.
207. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 584.
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According to Coke in Acton's Case, the maxim was "commonly
said."2' While the context in which it was commonly said remains
unclear, Acton's Case and Bennet's speech in Parliament are strong
evidence that its common use was ecclesiastical.' Although the ap-
plication of the maxim in Acton's Case is not quite Bennet's "as one
Parson of two churches, one Dean of two Deaneries," both instances
are far different still from the maxim's source in Bartolus. In Calvin's
Case it was used to determine the rights of subjects in separate
kingdoms. The transformation is one from ecclesiastical governance
to political governance of non-clerics.21°
In any event, although the cum duo jura maxim does not appear to
have been used in the medieval theory of the King's two bodies
before Calvin's Case,1 the common lawyers' use of this maxim in
connection with their peculiar theory of sovereignty is not surprising.
The theory of the King's two bodies, as it was developed by the time
of Bracton, seems to have originated in ecclesiastical notions of the
corpus mysticum and Christ's two natures.212 In essence, the theory
of the King's two capacities addressed a problem of continuity
necessary for perpetuating hereditary kingdoms: namely, what
happened to sovereignty upon the King's death-a problem confron-
ting continental civilian thinkers as well.21
From Plowden's Reports it is evident that common lawyers in the
late Tudor period were familiar with this dual concept of sovereign-
ty.2 4 According to Plowden,
208. Acton's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1108 (C.P. n.d.).
209. For another mention of the maxim, see WILLIAM CAWLEY, LAWS OF ELIZABETH,
JAMES, AND CHARLES I CONCERNING JESUITS (London, J. Wright and R. Chiswell 1680). See
also BROOM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 52, at 6.
210. The maxim would be used through the 18th century in rules relating to marriage and
descent. See Jones v. Davies, 158 Eng. Rep. 573 (Ex. Ch. 1861); Jones v. Davies, 157 Eng. Rep.
1386 (Ex. 1860); HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 530 (Philadelphia, T. &
J.W. Johnson & Co., 8th ed. 1882).
211. A similar idea may be found in Plowden's Reports: "Yet [despite the unity of the two
bodies] his Capacity to take in the Body natural is not confounded by the Body politic, but
remains still." See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 66, at 12 (quoting Plowden).
212. On sources of the corpus mysticum in Roman and canon law, see id. at 16,43, 147,267-
68.
213. Id. at 273, 298.
214. See id. at 20 (quoting Plowden). English civil lawyers writing around the time of
Calvin's Case also used "body politick," but not in the context of the King's person. See
HAYWARD, supra note 132, at 15 ("For, as in a natural body, no sudden change is without some
peril, so in a politic body, it is so much the greater .. "). Cowell, in his Interpreter, used "body
politic" in a more general sense of "corporation." He included a "religious company" in his
general definition of "corporation" as a "universitatum, or collegium, a body politick authorized
by the King's charter."
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that by the Common Law no Act which the King does as king,
shall be defeated by his Nonage. For the King has in him two
Bodies, viz., a Body natural, and a Body politic. His Body
natural ... is a Body mortal, subject to all Infirmities that come
by Nature or Accident... and to the like Defects that happen
to the natural Bodies of other People. But his Body politic is a
Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and
Government, and constituted for the Direction of the People, and
the Management of the public weal ... what the King does in his
Body politic, cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any Disability
in his natural Body.215
The cum duo jura maxim also made sense in the theory of the
King's two bodies because, again from Plowden, the two bodies were
inseparable:
So that he has a Body natural, adorned and invested with the
Estate and Dignity royal; and he has not a Body natural distinct
and divided by itself from the Office and Dignity royal, but a
Body natural and a Body politic together indivisible; and these
two Bodies are incorporated in one Person, and make one Body
and not divers, that is the Body corporate in the Body natural, et
e contra the Body natural in the Body corporate. So that the
Body natural, by this conjunction of the Body politic to it... is
magnified, and by the said Consolidation hath in it the Body
politic.
216
Thus, in 1608, ample precedent existed for the distinction between
the King's two bodies-enough that Coke readily admitted the dual
capacity of the king.217 However, the theory had apparently not
been used before to determine who was a subject and who was an
alien. Coke found the defendants' plea "a mere stranger in this case,
such a one as the eye of the law (our books and book-cases) never
saw, as the ears of the law (our reporters) never heard of .... In a
word, this little plea is a great stranger to the laws of England
.... 218 The core of the defendants' challenge, the innovative appli-
cation of the two-body theory to the law of subjects and aliens, placed
the origins of allegiance inside the province of human law in a way
that the language ad fidem Regis would otherwise prohibit. Because
the basic theory of the King's two bodies was not unprecedented in
the common law, the addition of the maxim cum duo jura to the
215. See id. at 7 (quoting Plowden); see also Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 388-89 (K.B.
1608).
216. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 66, at 9 (quoting Plowden).
217. See 77 Eng. Rep. at 388.
218. 77 Eng. Rep. at 381.
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theory posed substantial difficulties for the justices in the Exchequer
Chamber.
IV. THE RESOLUTION OF CALVIN'S CASE
The theory of the King's two bodies presented two questions that
had to be settled in order to decide Calvin's Case. The first question,
to which of the King's two capacities a subject's allegiance was due,
was answered by Coke by his determination that allegiance was due
to the King's natural body by the law of nature.219 The second
question was related to the first: Would allegiance to the King's
natural body be sufficient to make one a natural subject within a
separate body politic?
Coke's affirmative answer to this second question required an
understanding of sovereignty that had much in common with civilian
legal thought. The difficulties posed by the second question required
an understanding of the meaning of "body politic" as applied to the
government of England in the early seventeenth century. The King's
body politic arose from a mystical notion of immortality and
immutability attributed to the crown to provide for continuity of
sovereignty upon succession." When applied to the kingdom,
however, body politic meant that part of the kingdom which was
"framed by the policy of man," 221 a notion widely used by civilians
and common lawyers alike to refer to the public and private laws of
the realm. The laws of England were the sinews and nerves of the
body politic, with the King as its head.2 2 The defendants in Calvin's
Case understood "body politic" to have positive law connotations. The
defendants pointed to "municipal laws of this realm [that have]
prescribed the order and form" of allegiance, or legal obedience. 
2 1
219. Ellesmere denied that the King had two separable capacities to which allegiance might
be due. Both Ellesmere and Bacon thought this a "dangerous distinction," and accordingly
Ellesmere found that the plaintiff was de jure a natural subject by virtue of his allegiance to the
person who was also sovereign of England under the ad fidem regis formulation. Ellesmere's
conclusion seems to be squarely in line with the development of the law of subjects and aliens
prior to Calvin's Case. See KNAFLA, supra note 167, at 246; 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra
note 37, at 666-67. Coke also thought the distinction between the King's two bodies was
dangerous; he claimed, in fact, that it was treason to separate the two. Coke's position, however,
was that allegiance was to the natural body, to which the body politic was inseparably attached.
See 77 Eng. Rep. at 390.
220. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 66, at 16, 43, 147, 267-68.
221. 77 Eng. Rep. at 388, 389. Coke did not clearly distinguish this meaning of "body politic"
from the term as applied to the capacities of the king, for he followed this definition with: "and
... [it] is called a mystical body." Id. at 388 (citation omitted).
222. See, e.g., HAYWARD, supra note 132, at 8, 15; 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 566;
77 Eng. Rep. at 388-89.
223. 77 Eng. Rep. at 383.
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Coke, on the other hand, resoundingly rejected the idea that the
allegiance owed at birth was tied to municipal law. Instead, Coke
maintained that it was required by the divine law of nature.224
Coke's resolution of the case essentially followed that suggested by
Bacon-allegiance was due by the law of nature to the King's natural
body, and since both Scottish and English subjects owed allegiance to
the same sovereign, Scots who were born into the allegiance of James
at the time he was also King of England were natural subjects in
England. Coke's contribution was to spell out more clearly why this
last proposition should be so. Although the two countries might have
different laws, Scots were subject to the same natural law of al-
legiance as the English. Despite finding clear authority in Cobledike's
Case that if Robert Calvin were ad fidem Regis he was "no alien,"
Coke agreed with the defendants that the question still to be resolved
implicated the theory of the King's two bodies.25 Coke reached a
result consistent with past English practice by recognizing that persons
born in territories acquired by an English sovereign "in blood and by
descent" were natural subjects in England.2 6
According to Coke, the mutual oath between a liege lord and his
subject was natural ligeance. Natural ligeance existed between the
King and his subjects, with the King offering protection in return for
loyalty.227 To support his claim that every subject from birth was
presumed by law to be sworn to the natural person of the king, Coke
pointed to the banishment of the Spencers by Edward II, allegedly for
the offending words:
that homage and oath of ligeance was more by reason of the
King's crown (that is, of his politic capacity) than by reason of
the person of the King... [so that] if the King do not demean
himself by reason in right of his Crown, his lieges be bound by
oath to remove the king.22
In addition, Coke discussed the nature of hereditary sovereignty in
England in order to show that this feudal notion of allegiance could
not be to the King's body politic. The King "holdeth the kingdom of
224. See id. at 393, 394.
225. See id. at 389 ("[S]eeing the King hath but one person, and several capacities, and one
politic capacity for the realm of England, and another for the realm of Scotland, it is necessary
to be considered, to which capacity ligeance is due.").
226. Id.
227. See id. (citation omitted). In this passage, Coke also noted that a body politic can "nei-
ther make or take homage."
228. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 390 (K.B. 1608); see also BROOM, supra note 52, at
15-16. Bacon likened this to the poison of a scorpion, "by which Act doth plainly appear the
perilous consequence of this distinction concerning the person of the King and the crown." 7
WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 669-70.
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England by birth right inherent, by descent from the blood Royal,
whereupon succession doth attend. ' 229 Because the sovereign's title
was "by the descent" and "without any essential ceremony or act to
be done ex post facto" (e.g., coronation), there could be no interreg-
num.' Hence, the body politic, or laws of the realm, added nothing
to James's rightful claim to sovereignty. Nonetheless, his rightful claim
to sovereignty was the basis for the allegiance owed by his subjects:
"[S]o as for these special purposes the law makes him a body politic,
immortal and invisible, whereunto our ligeance cannot appertain.""
Coke next turned to the source of this allegiance. The law of
nature, part of the law of England, required the allegiance of a subject
to his "natural liege Sovereign. ' ' 2 Coke wrote that "[t]he law of
nature is that which God at the time of creation of the nature of man
infused into his heart, for his preservation and direction; and this is
lex aeterna, the moral law, called also the law of nature."" Coke
further wrote:
And the reason hereof is, for that God and nature is one to all,
and therefore the law of God and nature is one to all. By this law
of nature is the faith, ligeance, and obedience of the subject due
to his Sovereign or superior.... This law of nature, which indeed
is the eternal law of the Creator, infused into the heart of the
creature at the time of his creation, was two thousand years
before any laws written, and before any judicial or municipal
laws.23
Coke cited Aristotle's Politica as evidence that power to command
obedience for the profit of society was of the law of nature and before
any municipal laws. Further, according to Coke, Fortescue provided
evidence that before there were any municipal laws, English kings had
decided cases according to natural equity-more evidence that the law
of nature existed before the development of much of what seven-
229. 77 Eng. Rep. at 389.
230. Id. at 389-90. Coke referred to the example of Henry VI. Several persons were
convicted of treason despite the fact that the King was not crowned until the eighth year of his
reign. Id. at 390.
231. Id. at 391.
232. Id. at 391-92. Coke also called this the lex aeterna, the "moral law," citing Bracton,
Fortescue, and St. German's Doctor and Student for the proposition that the natural law was
part of the law of England. Id. See generally Coquillette, supra note 118, at 22-23. Medieval
natural law theory, with its firm anchor in religious thought, is far removed from and not to be
confused with contemporary natural law theory. On recent debate of natural law theory as a
contemporary construct, see Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Case For Natural Law Reexamined, 38 AM.
J. JURIS. 1 (1993). Whether the rule of territorial birthright citizenship may be supported by con-
temporary natural law theory is beyond the scope of this Article.
233. 77 Eng. Rep. at 392.
234. Id. at 392.
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teenth-century lawyers considered to be the common or customary
law of England.235
The critical result was that allegiance to the English sovereign, and
for a time, acquisition of and rights associated with citizenship in the
former American colonies, were considered not to be the subject of
municipal or positive law-making. Coke stated:
Seeing then that faith, obedience, and ligeance are due by the
law of nature, it followeth that the same cannot be changed or
taken away; for albeit judicial or municipal laws have inflicted
and imposed in several places, or at several times, divers and
several punishments and penalties, for breach or not observance
of the law of nature, (for that law only consisted in commanding
or prohibiting, without any certain punishment or penalty), yet
the very law of nature itself never was nor could be altered or
changed. And therefore it is certainly true, that jura naturalia
sunt immutabilia.236
More importantly, Calvin's Case also established by implication the
rule of the jus soli itself as a divine institution, ordained by the laws
of God and nature. The antenati remained aliens even though they
currently owed allegiance to the person who was King of England.
"Calvin the plaintiff," Coke wrote, was "naturalized by procreation
and birth-right." 7 This was because, according to Coke, one's status
is "vested by birthright:"
[F]or as the antenati remain aliens as to the Crown of England,
because they were born when there were several kings of the
several kingdoms, and the uniting of the kingdoms by descent
subsequent cannot make him a subject to that Crown to which he
was alien at the time of his birth .... [AIll those that were born
under one natural obedience while the realms were united under
one sovereign, should remain natural born subjects, and no
aliens; for that naturalization due and vested by birthright, cannot
by any separation of the Crowns afterward be taken away: nor he
that was by judgment of law a natural subject at the time of his
birth, become an alien by such a matter ex post facto.238
The conservative English approach to the status of the Scots
favored de jure naturalization of only the postnati. In this way, the
effects (perceived or real) of Scots invading England as land and
office holders would be gradual, because only those persons born
after 1603 would be entitled to hold land or office, barring individual
235. See id.
236. Id. at 392-93.
237. Id. at 394.
238. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
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acts of denization by James I. The decision in Calvin's Case thus drew
a distinction based upon time of birth, permitting Scottish children,
but not their Scottish parents, to be natural subjects, thereby
grounding the rule firmly in what we know today as the jus soli. Thus,
the time of birth was "of essence,'' 9 and it, too, became part of the
divine law embraced by Coke:
But if enemies should come into any of the King's dominions,
and surprise any castle or fort, and possess the same by hostility,
and have issue there, that issue is no subject to the king, though
he be born within his dominions, for that he was not born under
the King's ligeance or obedience. But the time of his birth is of
the essence of a subject born; for he cannot be a subject to the
King of England, unless at the time of his birth he was under the
ligeance and obedience of the king. And that is the reason that
antenati in Scotland (for that at the time of their birth they were
under the ligeance and obedience, of another king) are aliens
born, in respect of the time of their birth.2"
The distinction appears to us today almost ludicrous: Scottish parents
owed the same allegiance to James as did their children, but unless
they had been born owing that allegiance, that is, born after 1603,
they were not natural subjects. Thus, to some extent an historical acci-
dent-the failure of the Tudor line and descent of the English crown
to James Stuart of Scotland-established the jus soli as a product of
natural law in a way that the jus sanguinis, in England at least, never
was.
The Law of Nature
Having found allegiance due to the King's natural body by the law
of nature, Coke still faced the problem that troubled Bacon-why the
law of nature also required subjects in a King's various territories to
be naturalized as to each other. Said another way, the problem was
to explain why James's Scottish subjects born after he inherited the
English throne were entitled to be treated as Englishmen when in
England, while James's Scottish subjects born before 1603 were not so
239. Id. at 399.
240. Id. (emphasis added). The first sentence of this excerpt also shows the critical impor-
tance of birth ad fidem Regis: An enemy, even one born within the King's territories, was
excluded from the status of natural-born subject. The requirement that one owed allegiance at
birth, then, provided exceptions from the rule of the jus soli for enemy aliens within a territory
under hostile circumstances. Though subjects swore allegiance to the sovereign by formal oath
periodically, see CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 271, for purposes of their status as natural-
born subjects, Coke said they were "presumed by law" to have sworn their oath to the King. See
Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 389 (K.B. 1608). In cases of insurrection or swearing al-
legiance to another sovereign, however, the presumption could be dispelled.
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entitled. Coke's answer, drawn from the law of nature, and, he
claimed, the law of "all other nations," was that the allegiance due to
James from his Scottish subjects born after 1603 was now the same as
that due from his English subjects.241 Those born before 1603 were
born into a different allegiance and could only become subjects in
England by act of positive law subsequent to their birth. Further,
because this law of nature was "immutable," the result for the postnati
was not changed by the fact that Scotland had a different legal system
from England. Because there was only "one ligeance" to one king,
and the primary allegiance that mattered was that acquired at birth,
Calvin was not an alien in England.24
Surprisingly, then, although Coke cited the statute De Natis and
Cobledike's Case, among other precedents, the law of determining
natural-born status as developed from the fourteenth century was not
central to Coke's resolution of the case. Rather, Coke based his
holding upon an "immutable" natural law that preceded any
municipal or judicial law in England. At least for the legal basis of
allegiance, in contrast to the theory of the King's two bodies, Coke
endorsed a more unified notion of sovereignty in holding for the
plaintiff in Calvin's Case. The result, nonetheless, was that the postnati
enjoyed the protections of English law, even though all Scottish
subjects while in Scotland were out of the jurisdictional reach of the
English Parliament. 43 Thus Coke added a horizontal link between
the Scottish postnati and English subjects to the vertical relationship
between subject and sovereign. According to Coke,
[I]f the obedience and ligeance of the subject to his sovereign be
due by the law of nature, if that law be parcel of the laws, as well
of England, as of all other nations, and is immutable, and that
[the] postnati and we of England are united by birth-right in
obedience and ligeance (which is the true cause of natural
subjection) by the law of nature, it followeth that Calvin the
plaintiff.., cannot be an alien born .... [F]or... the law hath
wrought... a union of ligeance and obedience of the subjects of
both kingdoms, due by the law of nature.... [A]nd this in
substance is but a uniting of the hearts of the subjects of both
kingdoms one to another, under one head and sovereign.2"
241. See 77 Eng. Rep. at 394.
242. See id.
243. On the later development of the right of protection owed to the subject from the
reciprocal obligation, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 513 (1991).
244. 77 Eng. Rep. at 394.
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Coke thus created a rule to determine status at birth that was
"immutable" and hence could not be changed by human laws.
245
Scotland, by contrast, resolved the status of James's English subjects
by statute. In 1607, the Scottish Parliament passed an act that
provided for naturalization not only of the English postnati but of the
antenati as well, with the only limitation for the antenati being that
they could not hold office of crown, judiciary, or Parliament except by
exercise of the royal prerogative.24 The Scottish Parliament enacted
the naturalization charter with considerable resentment over the
defeat of James's proposals to the English Parliament concerning
naturalization of the Scots and over James's refusal to naturalize all
Scots by prerogative power.247 The resentment, in fact, made the
Act something of a rhetorical gesture: The naturalization provisions
were "suspendit and ... of na strength force nor effect heireftir Ay
and quhill and unto the speciall tyme that the Estaittis of England be
thair Acts and statutis in Parliament decerne grant and allow the
same.,248
The English Parliament, of course, did not enact a naturalization
bill; instead, the matter was determined by the judges in Calvin's
Case. Little is known of the effect of the Scottish naturalization
statute after the decision in Calvin's Case. Had the Scottish courts
instead determined the status of English subjects by judicial decree,
the juxtaposition with Calvin's Case would have provided an
unparalleled opportunity for comparative legal history on the law of
citizenship in the two kingdoms. In any event, the fact that the
English Parliament failed to enact any statute naturalizing the Scots
permitted the English judges to decide the matter, thus ushering
natural law into what would later become the rule of the jus soli.
Chancellor Ellesmere, in his report of the case, best explained the
nature of allegiance that made the Scottish postnati subjects together
with the English:
This bond of allegiance, whereof we dispute, is vinculum fidei; it
bindeth the soul and conscience of every subject severally and
respectively, to be faithful and obedient to the king: and as a soul
or conscience cannot be framed by policy; so faith and allegiance
cannot be framed by policy, nor put into a politic body. An oath
must be sworn by a natural body; homage and fealty must be
done by a natural body, a politic body cannot do it.... As the
245. See id. at 382.
246. See GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 129.
247. See id. at 119, 129.
248. This provision from the "Act Anent the Unioun of Scotland and England" passed by
the Scots Parliament on August 11, 1607, is quoted in GALLOWAY, supra note 29, at 129.
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King nor his heart cannot be divided, for he is one entire King
over all his subjects, in whichsoever of his kingdoms and
dominions they were born, so he must not be served or obeyed
by halves; he must have entire and perfect obedience of his
subjects .... [AInd he, that is born an entire and perfect subject
ought by reason and law to have all the freedoms, privileges, and
benefits pertaining to his birthright in all the King's dominions
249
Coke's assertion that the determining factor in Calvin's Case was "a
union of ligeance and obedience of the subjects of both kingdoms, due
by the law of nature to their Sovereign, 250 should not be read to
support Bacon's claim that the sovereign was not subject to municipal
laws,25' even though allegiance was not dependent upon municipal
law. And though Coke also said that the reciprocal obligations of
subject and sovereign are not "tied to municipal laws, '' 1 2 if Coke
meant that there was no legal limit upon a King's actions, this would
be an astonishing outcome, given that in coming years Coke would
champion the parliamentary cause against royal prerogative, highly
irritating Bacon in the process.
At the time of Calvin's Case, though, the King's prerogative was an
issue of concern to Coke and some members of the English Par-
liament. We know from other sources that Coke clearly supported a
constitutional limit to the King's prerogative, although he accepted
James's basic theory of government.2 3 This larger story is a compli-
cated topic, with an even more complicated historiography. In 1604
Parliament refused James's request to change his title from King of
England to King of Great Britain 25 4 and rejected James's goal of a
union of laws and institutions of the two kingdoms. Parliament
thereby expressed its fear that union of the two kingdoms was part of
a larger plan to destroy English law and subjugate the English Par-
249. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 691.
250. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 394 (K.B. 1608) (emphasis added).
251. See 7 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 37, at 643-46.
252. 77 Eng. Rep. at 393.
253. See Berman, supra note 94, at 1673-78. See generally CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN,
THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1956); STEPHEN
D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMON LAW," 1621-1628
(1982).
254. Had the new style "king of Great Britain" taken effect by statute, some judges
contended that the result would be "an utter extinction of all the laws not in force." See
JACOBEAN UNION, supra note 129, at xxii. That argument reflected the view of many in
Parliament that the change in title by itself would abrogate both Scottish and English law and
create a union between the two kingdoms. Id. at xxi, xxxii.
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liament. 255 Coke was surely aware of this ambivalence as he wrote
his opinion in Calvin's Case.
Coke's limiting principle in Calvin's Case appears to have been the
reciprocal nature of the relationship placed on subject and sovereign.
In return for the subject's loyalty, the sovereign owed "protection and
government due by the law of nature." '256 Although Coke did not
elaborate what the law of nature might require of the King concerning
protection and government of his subjects, an avenue of restraint
upon royal prerogative was clearly present. Coke could have chosen
the theory of the King's two bodies as argued in Calvin's Case as a
principle limiting royal prerogative. That he instead insisted that the
King had a political body only for a few specific purposes,2 and
chose to place the King under the law of nature (a position that
ultimately lead to Coke's dismissal as chief justice in 1616), perhaps
reveals the continuing hazard of adopting any stance suggesting
treason. Despite this fundamental difference between Bacon's propos-
als and Coke's resolution of Calvin's Case, both reached outside of
English precedent in order to affirm Robert Calvin's claim that he
was a natural subject of the King of England.
In England, the immediate effect of Calvin's Case was minimal. The
decision meant that an entire generation would pass before the effects
would be felt. In 1603 few postnati were old enough to pose any
immediate threat of wholesale incursions into English patronage.
Parliamentary compilations for the period immediately following
Calvin's Case record occasional acts of denization of Scottish antenati,
but the numbers are not overwhelming.258 Calvin's Case itself ap-
pears to have generated little comment in England. If general accep-
tance is the "age-old sanction of law,"259 then the relative lack of
criticism in the two decades after 1608 attests to its strength. A speech
in Parliament by Sir Robert Phelps, in 1628, is apparently one of the
255. A summary of the background of the Anglo-Scottish union is provided in Liam Seamus
O'Melinn, Note, The American Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Seventeenth-Century West
Indies, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 116-20 (1995).
256. See Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 394 (K.B. 1608).
257. See id. at 391.
258. See, e.g., 11 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS AND MANUSCRIPTS, RELATING TO ENGLISH
AFFAIRS 451 (Horatio F. Brown ed., 1905); CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES,
OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, 1603-1610, at 68, 81, 83, 220, 398, 401, 415, 430, 532 (Mary Anne
Everett Green ed., London, Longman, Brown 1857); CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC
SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, 1611-1618, at 84, 110, 179, 194, 210,250,271,292, 293, 407,
449, 451, 551, 557, 593 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., London, Longman, Brown 1858); 2
COMMONS DEBATES, supra note 110, at 528, 533, 535; 3 COMMONS DEBATES, supra note 110,
at 6, 11, 349, 350; 5 COMMONS DEBATES, supra note 110, at 204, 214, 281, 288, 290, 291, 298,
300, 303, 308; 6 COMMONS DEBATES, supra note 110, at 70, 74, 180.
259. See John M. Zane, German Legal Philosophy, 16 MICH. L. REV. 287, 348 (1918).
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few recorded instances of public criticism of the decision. Phelps
considered Calvin's Case to be the first of several court decisions "all
exceeding one another in prejudice. ',260 Of Calvin's Case, he said, "I
do not complain of it but only mention it''261 in a diatribe against
"foreign dangers" and James's perceived increasing propensity to
"scoff at Parliaments, at laws, at all., 262
V. CONTINENTAL LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE Jus FEUDALE
A. The Acquisition of Citizenship at Birth in France and the Italian
Cities
Was there any possibility for the judges of England in 1608 to draw
directly from continental examples in their consideration of the status
of the postnati? At the time of Calvin's Case, there were perhaps as
many as one hundred civil lawyers in England who had studied the jus
gentium, or the law of nations, at Oxford, Cambridge, or abroad.
These professionals were a source of contemporary knowledge of
international law and practice.263 Because of their knowledge and
experience with questions of international law, civilians were often
used in diplomatic service and as advisors to the Privy Council on
treaties and other issues concerning international relations.26" They
were, in fact, consulted on the status of James's Scottish subjects in
England in the Commons debates preceding Calvin's Case. The
evidence suggests that some participants in the political debates in
England over the status of James's Scottish subjects were both
interested in, and at least vaguely informed about, naturalization
practices in the "civil law" as well as in other kingdoms and ter-
ritories. 265 A brief consideration of some naturalization practices on
the continent is therefore instructive to consider the extent to which
English jurists in 1608 could borrow from other legal systems.2"
260. See 2 COMMONS DEBATES, supra note 110, at 63.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 61.
263. See LEVACK, supra note 35, at 16-24.
264. See id. at 26-27.
265. See 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 11, at 565.
266. For European naturalization practices generally, see J.M. BARBALET, CITIZENSHIP
(1988); BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT,
1150-1650 (1982); CHARLOTIE C. WELLS, LAW AND CITIZENSHIP IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE
(1995); William M. Bowsky, Medieval Citizenship: The Individual and the State in the Commune
of Siena, 1287-1355, 4 STUD. IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE HIST. 195 (1967); Joseph
Canning, A Fourteenth-Century Contribution to the Theory of Citizenship: Political Man and the
Problem of Created Citizenship in the Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, in AUTHORITY AND
POWER: STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LAW AND GOVERNMENT PRESENTED TO WALTER ULLMANN
ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 197 (Brian Tierney ed., 1980); Jeffrey Merrick, Conscience and
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France and England are usually considered the best examples of the
emerging nation-state in the late middle ages and hence the earliest
examples for judicial determinations relating to national status. In
1600, citizenship had little meaning as a term designating national
status or origin for most European residents outside of France and
England. The term "citizen" was significant, if at all, only in the cities.
In rural areas, the feudal relationship with a local lord probably was
the most significant legal and social status.
While the discontinuities between what we might term "natural-
ization" practices in France and England in the early modem period
are striking, in some respects the legal developments during this
period parallel each other. The themes of discontinuity are: (1) The
scholastic sources from the Commentators, used by some French
jurists to describe acts and court decisions concerning
naturalization,267 seem never to have been a part of English legal
discourse on the acquisition of the status of natural-born subject; (2)
French jurists (and the earlier Commentators) sometimes used the
word "citizen" interchangeably with the word "subject" in legal
discourse, with some expression that the relationship was contrac-
tual,2" an idea not as evident in English legal thought; and (3)
French jurists (following the Commentators and the practice in the
Italian cities) placed more emphasis on the jus sanguinis as a theory
underlying all rules of naturalization.269 On the other hand, the
themes of continuity include: (1) As in England, the function of legal
rules concerning naturalization were formed through questions of in-
heritance and land-holding; (2) an emerging concept of the jus soli in
France contemporary with Calvin's Case broadened the scholastic
emphasis on the jus sanguinis;2 ° and (3) at least in the writings of
Jean Bodin, a parallel idea that allegiance was a natural, irrevocable
duty by native-born persons, creating a vertical bond between prince
and subject individually rather than a horizontal bond between
citizens as a whole.271
French and Italian jurists in the fifteenth century frequently consid-
ered questions of status acquired at birth according to a model of
citizenship developed by the Commentators. The city-states of Italy
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries gave rise to jurists who had
Citizenship in Eighteenth-Century France, 20 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 48 (1987); Peter
Riesenberg, Citizenship and Equality in Late Medieval Italy, 15 STUDIA GRATIANA 424 (1972).
267. See WELLS, supra note 266, at 49.
268. See id. at 88, 92, 100; RIESENBERG, supra note 79, at 208-09.
269. See WELLS, supra note 266, at 36-37, passim.
270. See id. at 36.
271. See id. at 58-60; see also infra text accompanying notes 330-33.
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only recently rediscovered the Roman law texts compiled under
Justinian, which they systematized into the Corpus Juris Civilis. The
Commentators, who followed later, devoted themselves to the Corpus
Juris to apply that body of learning to then-contemporary legal issues
within the city-state. Bartolus. 72 was among the first to consider the
Roman law of acquisition of citizenship, the civilitas civitatis. Persons
became citizens either by birth or by statutory process. Under the
formulation articulated by Bartolus, and apparently followed in the
Italian cities of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a citizen by
birth-a civis ab origine-was one who had been born within the
territory of the state and to at least one parent who was already a
citizen of the state.273 French jurists and courts in the sixteenth
century seem to apply opinions and ideas from the Corpus Juris
Civilis of the Commentators, especially rules establishing citizenship
according to the jus sanguinis, to a much greater extent than can be
discerned from the arguments in the English Parliament and in
Calvin's Case. French jurists, in fact, made far greater efforts to link
French practices with ancient Greece and Rome than with earlier
practice in France or even contemporary Italian practices.274
The continuities and discontinuities with English legal practices
aside, legal developments in France do not seem to have provided any
direct precedent or examples to resolve Calvin's Case. In the decades
prior to Calvin's Case, French courts had no occasion to consider
wholesale naturalization of a separate kingdom, as in the case of the
postnati in England. Instead, incorporation of separate kingdoms had
occurred by conquest such as after the Italian wars, or by royal act or
legislation.275 Interestingly, because of political alliances during the
sixteenth century, Scots enjoyed many privileges in France, though
they appear never to have been considered as a group to be the
equivalent of natural-born French subjects. 276
France, though often viewed to have employed a rule of the jus soli
in the period contemporary with Calvin's Case,277 in reality
employed a combination of both the jus soli and the jus sanguinis
272. Bartolus de Saxoferrato, a 14th-century Italian Commentator on the Digest, is widely
viewed as the first scholar of the Civil Law to write systematically on international law. See
BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 9-11, 14-15 (Joseph H. Beale trans., 1979).
273. See WELLS, supra note 266, at 5.
274. See id. at 42, 49.
275. See id. at 32.
276. See id. at 49.
277. See, e.g., HJ. Randall, Nationality and Naturalization: A Study in the Relativity of Law,
40 LAW Q. REV. 18, 25 (1924) ("Most striking in this connection is the development of the law
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similar to Italian definitions of natural citizenship.278 Prior to the
sixteenth century, the children of foreign parents were unable to
inherit land in France even if they had been born within the kingdom
of France.2 79 A growing tendency to emphasize the jus soli can be
discerned in the sixteenth century, but French jurists simultaneously
developed the view that citizenship depended, to some degree, upon
intent of the individual to reside in France, and they also linked
citizenship with membership in the corporation that embodied the
state.280
B. Excommunication and Religious Oaths of Allegiance
Yet another group of legal scholars at work in Europe around the
time of Calvin's Case possessed a developed law of hierarchical,
governing relationship-the Canonists. The extent of their contribu-
tion to rules determining the acquisition of citizenship status has not
been considered in the detail that it deserves. Ecclesiastical courts in
England as well as France dealt with issues related to domicile and
status in its family law jurisdiction (including disposition of property),
the status of aliens, excommunicants,2 81 sectarians, and others. Thus,
a thorough study of ecclesiastical courts and the laws they applied
could well produce evidence of a contribution by canon lawyers to the
development of legal theories determining national status. Excom-
munication, in fact, provides a strikingly close analogy to the law of
subjects and aliens developed in the early modern period. Excom-
munication in the middle ages, in England and on the continent, did
not entail banishment or physical exclusion from a territory, but
rather was a type of public ostracism within the community,
separating an individual from some benefits of community member-
ship to encourage repentance and return to the spiritual fold.' The
line between political and spiritual community often blurred. Canon
law in the medieval period, for example, called for the suspension of
feudal ties owing to an excommunicant during the period of excom-
munication.' Furthermore, excommunicants could not sue in civil
litigation or accuse in criminal trials, excommunicants' rights as
defendants were curtailed, and excommunicants could not enforce
278. See WELLS, supra note 266, at 34.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 49.
281. See Richard Helmholz, Excommunication in Twelfth-Century England, 11 J.L. &
RELIGION 235 (1995).
282. See generally DONALD LOGAN, EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE SECULAR ARM IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1968); ELISABETH VODOLA, EXCOMMUNICATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES
(1986).
283. See VODOLA, supra note 282, at 67.
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contracts. Secular courts were held by canon law to enforce the
withdrawal from the community.' English royal courts frequently
recognized the legal disabilities of excommunicants from the twelfth
through the fifteenth centuries. 5 In these respects, excommunicants
and aliens suffered similar legal disabilities in the royal courts of
England, at least until the period of the Reformation.
As late as 1797, legal authority in England apparently still sup-
ported the rule that one who had been excommunicated by spiritual
authority suffered legal disabilities equivalent to those of aliens: "[B]y
the excommunication the party is disabled to sue any action, or to
have any remedy for any wrong done unto him so long as he shall
remain excommunicate."''  Furthermore, neither excommunication
nor alien status was necessarily permanent. Excommunicants and
aliens shared in common the need for formal admittance into the
political community. To restore civil rights to an excommunicant or
an alien, some formal adjudication was required, either by Church
authorities in the case of excommunication, or by Parliament or the
crown in the case of aliens.
After the Reformation, oaths of allegiance were increasingly used
as religious tests, and these oaths probably replaced excommunication
as the primary form of political control of religious beliefs. It is
therefore instructive to consider, however briefly, the relationship of
law, religion, and citizenship through the oaths of allegiance required
of adult subjects throughout the early modem period in England. 2'
In 1605, James promulgated a new oath of allegiance acknowledging
James as "lawful and rightful King" and promising to defend him in
case of attack.2' Critically, the oath also contained the following: "I
do from my heart abhor, detest, and adjure, as impious and heretical,
this damnable doctrine and position, that princes which be excom-
municated or deposed by the Pope may be deposed or murdered by
their subjects or any other whatsoever." 289 Clearly directed at
Catholics, the oath demanded that James's subjects deny the Pope's
284. See id. at 70-71.
285. See id. at 180 ("In the [English] royal courts the exception of excommunication was
endorsed by jurists and faithfully upheld by judges and advocates.... Forty cases ... document
its use from 1196 to 1411.").
286. See 2 RICHARD BURN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 259 (London, A. Strahan, 6th ed. 1797).
Bum cited Coke for the proposition generally that "[t]he Temporal Law and the Ecclesiastical
Law are so coupled together, that the one cannot subsist without the other." Id. at title page.
287. In 1559, for example, Elizabeth required an oath of allegiance of her Catholic subjects.
The Elizabethan oath acknowledged the Queen as supreme governor and denied the authority
of any outside person or state in matters "ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm." See
WORKS OF JAMES I, supra note 31, at lii.
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authority in secular matters. The oath was required of all non-noble
persons eighteen years of age and older after 1610.2"
How did James view the relationship, if any, between the oath of
allegiance taken as an adult, and the natural allegiance owing at
birth? In the 1607 tract An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, James
gave the following explanation:
[A] forme of Oath was framed to be taken by my Subjects,
whereby they should make a clear profession of their resolution,
faithfully to persist in their obedience unto me, according to their
natural allegiance; To the end that I might hereby make a
separation, not only between all my good Subjects in general, and
unfaithful Traitors, that intended to withdraw themselves from
my obedience: but specially to make a separation between so
many of my Subjects, who although they were otherwise Popishly
affected, yet retained in their hearts the print of their natural
duty to their sovereign: and those who . . . could not contain
themselves within the bounds of their natural allegiance, but
thought diversity of religion a safe pretext for all kinds of
treasons and rebellions against their sovereign.291
"Natural allegiance," of course, corresponds with the allegiance owing
at birth in Calvin's Case. All subjects owed allegiance to the crown
from birth. There is no obvious inconsistency in requiring a separate
oath of allegiance as an adult, because oaths of allegiance gave
content and definition to the general allegiance owing at birth. Oaths
could serve several purposes: (1) as confirmation of loyalty, similar to
practices in some Christian faiths in which infant baptism is followed
by confirmation upon reaching adulthood; (2) to ferret out religious
dissent; or (3) to identify treason or treasonous beliefs. In the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, in particular, there is clearly
a religious test motivating oaths of allegiance to the English monarch.
The substance of the oath, according to James (disingenuously), was
that the oath was "merely civil." '292
Catholics were expressly forbidden to take this oath by Paul V in
September 1606, pronouncements that provoked James's
Apologie.293 The result, according to James, was that the Pope's
admonition meant that Catholics "must now renounce and forswear
their profession of obedience already sworn, and so must as it were
at the third instance, foreswear [sic] their former two Oaths, first
closely sworn, by their birth in their natural Allegiance; and next,
290. See id.
291. Quoted in id. at 71-72.
292. Id. at 86.
293. JAMES HENDERSON BURNS, THE TRUE LAW OF KINGSHIP 267 (1996).
12719971
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clearly confirmed by this Oath, which doeth nothing but express the
same."
294
All of this suggests that we are only beginning to explore the
intersection between law and religion in the development of concepts
of citizenship. Coke, in fact, adopted Protestant teachings on the
status of Jews (derived from thirteenth-century canon law doctrines
on infidels) as part of natural law in Calvin's Case.295 The early
canonists developed a tradition of rights discourse,296 and its
relationship to the development of Western concepts of citizenship
only recently has begun to be explored.297
Although it is difficult to conclude that English lawyers in the early
seventeenth century could look to any specific continental legal
practice for a resolution of the problem of the postnati, Calvin's Case
was not the first consideration of that issue in writing of the time.
Two other legal thinkers, whose works were readily accessible to
Bacon and Coke, had earlier arrived at very similar conclusions
concerning the questions raised by Calvin's Case. One, Sir Thomas
Craig (1538-1608), a Scottish lawyer, wrote about the problem of the
postnati while serving on James's commission of union. Another, Jean
Bodin (1529-1596), the French civil lawyer and political thinker, in his
1576 work Les Six Livres de la Republique (first translated into
English in an edition published in 1606),298 proposed that the mutual
obligations between subject and King inherent in sovereignty brought
about a commonality of citizenship between communities with
differing laws.
C. Thomas Craig on the Feudal Law
In 1605, Craig addressed the question of naturalization of James's
Scottish subjects in his De Unione Regnorum Britanniae.99 Craig's
purpose in writing the De Unione was to advocate a "perfect"
union-a "single powerful monarchy" to avoid "the catastrophes of
294. See id. at 81-82 (emphasis added).
295. Coke wrote, for example, that "a perpetual enemy ... cannot maintain any action, or
get any thing within this realm. All infidels are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies .. "
Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 397 (K.B. 1608). Coke thus stated the law in England to be
that infidels were a special category of aliens and could never become subjects of a Christian
King. Coke also noted the differing effect of the conquest of a kingdom of an infidel and the
conquest of a kingdom of a Christian King with respect to the continued validity of local laws
in the conquered kingdom. See id. at 397-98.
296. See Charles J. Reid Jr., Thirteenth.Century Canon Law and Rights: The Word Ius and
Its Range of Subjective Meanings, 30 STUDIA CANONICA 295 (1996).
297. See RIESENBERG, supra note 79, at 203-52.
298. See BODIN, supra note 10.
299. See CRAIG, DE UNIONE 60, supra note 9.
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the past [that] have so vexed the island. ' '300 An essential component
of this perfect union was the "sharing of offices, dignities, and rights"
between the King's Scottish and English subjects. Craig concurred
with English opponents of a "perfect" union that this sharing would
not extend to those deemed "aliens" by English law. Thus, the issue
of naturalization of James's Scottish subjects received considerable
attention in Craig's De Unione.
30 1
The core of Craig's arguments on the question of status at birth
came from his conception of the international character of the jus
feudale.0 2 The jus feudale, or "feudal law," was taught as part of the
jus commune in the universities of Europe from the eleventh to
sixteenth centuries. Feudal law was a body of secular law governing
primarily the system of rights and obligations associated with lord-
vassal relationships, landholding and tenure. It had begun as manorial
custom, but came to be viewed as a system of customary law with
many commonalities in its practices throughout Europe.0 3 Craig
contended that English common law was Norman and feudal in
origin. Similarly, the law of Scotland was essentially feudal, and Craig
urged that James's governmental authority was based upon the
personal, reciprocal dependence of all the King's subjectS. 3 4 This
issue of union had earlier prompted Craig to write his Jus Feudale in
1603.305 In that work, Craig challenged the received view of the
origins of the common law in England. Craig traced English legal
practices to a medieval feudal code already in place in Scotland.3°
Craig's determination that all Scots were natural subjects in
England (and vice versa, for English subjects in Scotland)3°7 came
300. Id. at 227.
301. For example, Craig titled an entire chapter, "Whether a sharing of office, dignities, and
rights be'needful in the projected Union." See id. at 329-53. Various writers of the literature on
union also addressed this question, but Craig's work was by far the most extensive. Numerous
political tracts concerning the status of Scots in England show that the issue was widely debated
in the period from the ascension of James to the English throne to the time of Calvin's Case.
John Russell thought all Scots should be naturalized by royal prerogative. John Russell, A
Treatise of the Happy and Blessed Union, in JACOBEAN UNION, supra note 129, at 75, 127. John
Doddridge simply endorsed the position taken by the Commissioners in 1604-mutual
naturalization of the postnati on the basis of allegiance at birth to the same sovereign.
Doddridge, supra note 153, at 147. Sir Henry Spelman likewise thought the union of the crowns
in 1603 naturalized the postnati. Henry Spelman, Of the Union, in JACOBEAN UNION, supra note
129, at 160, 172.
302. On the jus feudale generally, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 295-315 (1983).
303. See generally Berman & Reid, supra note 147, at 5.
304. See POCOCK, supra note 96, at 84-87.
305. See 1 & 2 THOMAS CRAIG, THE Jus FEUDALE (James Clyde trans., 1934) [hereinafter
CRAIG, JUS FEUDALEI; ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 56 (1981).
306. See JACOBEAN UNION, supra note 129, at xxxvii.
307. CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 271, 276, 311-12, 339.
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from two related propositions: (1) that the common feudal origin of
the laws of England and Scotland resulted in substantial similarities
between the two legal systems; and (2) that because Englishmen and
Scots were common subjects of James, "vassals of the same
prince,,3°1 there should be no disparate treatment of Scots under the
laws of England.
Craig defined aliens under the jus feudale as persons born out of
the jurisdiction of the "liege prince," although a child born in another
sovereign's territory was not an alien "so long as the parents are
[regarded] as having died in loyalty to the king. ' '3 9 In many
countries aliens were denied the right of succession because such
persons "cannot be the liege man of two superiors. ,310 Thus, for
Craig, feudal principles of allegiance clearly determined the issue:
If we look at the subject in the light of feudal law, the fact that
a man cannot be the vassal of more than one liege lord strongly
supports our case; for if men are the vassals of the superior in
whose territory their possessions lie, they must share the privi-
leges of their co-vassals, a legal right which is obvious.... For
the English and ourselves are now the subjects of the same King
and superior. As therefore the legal grounds are clear which
forbid a foreigner to possess property in another prince's realm,
namely, lest it should be employed to the hurt of its own
superior, so also it is patent, that when the eventualities which
called for the rule are no longer able to arise, the rule itself must
cease to be operative."'
Accordingly, any English statutes purporting to exclude Scots from
offices or succession because of alien status were no longer operative:
If any one supposes that any statute exists depriving Scotsmen of
the power to enjoy the same rights and privileges as the English,
let him indicate the statute and the Parliament by which it was
passed. And even if such a statute could be found, it can no
longer be proceeded on, as the lawyers say, seeing that we then
were enemies and now are fellow subjects of the same king.
What is permitted to one subject cannot be denied to the other,
and we Scotsmen demand nothing more than that we should be
treated as fellow subjects.3 12
Thus, in the absence of a statute enacted specifically to establish the
legal status of the postnati, Craig thought that the law of England
308. Id. at 468.
309. CRAIG, JUS FEUDALE, supra note 305, at 774.
310. Id. at 771-74.
311. CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 339-40.
312. Id. at 335-36.
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would consider them natural subjects, just as the jus feudale would
conclude. The source of the rule in the jus feudale applied equally in
England and Scotland, according to Craig, because of the common
origins of both legal systems.
Coke, on the other hand, saw only a continuous and insular legal
practice of English common law with no parallel in Europe. In the
generation immediately following Coke, John Selden, an English legal
thinker of the mid-seventeenth century, would recognize that the
Norman Conquest brought substantial changes to English law,
including the introduction of feudal law.313 His views echoed Craig's
earlier writings in the Jus Feudale. A century later, Blackstone would
describe the feudal origins of the "allegiance" due from a subject:
With us in England, it becoming a settled principle of tenure that
all lands in the kingdom are holden of the King as sovereign and
lord paramount, no oath but that of fealty could ever be taken to
inferior lords, and the oath of allegiance was necessarily confined
to the person of the King alone. By an easy analogy the term of
allegiance was soon brought to signify all other engagements
which are due from subjects to their prince, as well as those
duties which were simply and merely territorial.314
One remarkable aspect of the feudal origins of the allegiance due
from a subject is that, despite the commonality of feudal law across
Europe, England would derive from this allegiance a judicial rule of
the jus soli by historical accident.
D. Jean Bodin on Mutual Citizenship
Another source of political and legal writing about citizenship was
the French civil lawyer and political thinker Jean Bodin. Undoubtedly
Coke was familiar with Bodin; Bodin's political works were well-
known in early seventeenth-century England. One historian claimed
that in 1600 no other political writer was cited in England "more
often or more favorably" than Bodin.315 Another historian cited a
dozen treatises from the Elizabethan and Stuart periods making use
of Bodin's formulation of the idea of sovereignty.316 James himself,
in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, written in 1598,317 derived
many of his ideas from Bodin, stressing the obligation of a monarch
313. See Berman, supra note 94, at 1696. See also POCOCK, supra note 96.
314. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *367.
315. Kenneth McRae, in BODIN supra note 10, at A-63 (citation omitted).
316. George Mosse, The Influence of Jean Bodin's Republique on English Political Thought,
5 MEDIEVALIA ET HUMANISTICA 73 (1948).
317. See WORKS OF JAMES I, supra note 31, at 53.
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otherwise absolute in his power to rule by law.318 Bodin's Republi-
que became known in England soon after the first French edition was
published in 1576.319 Richard Knolles began the translation for the
first English edition in 1603, in the immediate aftermath of James's
accession to the English throne, and several years after Bodin's
death.3 °
Though Bodin used the Latin civis for citizen, a term not used in
English legal discourse at the time of Calvin's Case, Bodin often used
the term interchangeably with "subject" in the Republique. In fact, the
distinctions between Bodin's "citizen" and the English "subject" were
few. Bodin clearly meant for the term "citizen" to represent a feudal
relationship between sovereign and subject, according to his definition
for the status of "a Citizen, which is no other in proper terms than a
free subject holding of the soveraigntie of another man. "32 A group
of citizens holding of one sovereign constituted a "great kingdom,"
which "is no other thing than a great Commonwealth, under the
government of one chief sovereign."" Further, "[i]t is then the
acknowledgment and obedience of the free subject towards his
sovereign prince, and the tuition, justice, and defense of the prince
towards the subject, which maketh the citizen. ' '3' The status of
citizen, then, had feudal overtones, representing a mutual obligation
between a superior and an inferior, a liege lord and a subject.
In chapters six and seven of the first book of the Republique, Bodin
described the attributes and obligations of citizenship. Similar to the
practice in England, citizens were either "natural" or "naturalized."
The natural citizen was the "free subject who is a native of the
commonwealth, in that both, or one or other of his parents, was born
there.... The naturalized citizen is one who makes a voluntary
submission to the sovereign authority of another, and is accepted as
his subject., 324 The natural citizen, or subject, was born into submis-
sion:
318. See Berman, supra note 94, at 1667-73.
319. See WORKS OF JAMES I, supra note 31, at A-62. See generally GEORGE MOSSE,
STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND (1950).
320. See Kenneth McRae, in BODIN, supra note 10, at A58-59.
321. Id. at 47.
322. Id. at 10.
323. Id. at 64.
324. Id. at 49. This translation is from the 1955 M.J. Tooley edition. JEAN BODIN, SIX
BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 19-20 (M.J. Tooley trans. 1955) [hereinafter BODIN, Tooley
Edition]. Bodin, in fact, criticized Aristotle's definition of citizenship, based in a notion of the
"popular state," preferring instead a definition of citizen as one who "enjoys the rights and
privileges of a city." Id. at 53. English legal discourse on the acquisition of status at the time of
Calvin's Case, by contrast, is concerned less with "rights and privileges" than it is with the effect
of that status on the ability to hold and inherit property.
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Privileges make not a citizen, but the mutual obligation of the
sovereign to the subject, to whom, for the faith and obedience he
receives, owes justice, counsel, aid, and protection, which is not
due strangers .... [T]he true citizen either is born [into submis-
sion] or else submits himself to the rule and sovereign power of
another man.3"
Unlike Craig's De Unione, Bodin's Republique did not offer a
general rule for determining who was a natural-born subject. The only
mention of acquisition of citizenship by birth suggests that a rule
Bodin thought similar to that of the Romans should be followed: One
became a "natural citizen" if born to at least one parent who was a
citizen, irrespective of place of birth.326 Otherwise, one must become
"naturalized" by some form of municipal law or act of a sovereign if
one were born within the sovereign's territory but of alien parents.
This is Bodin's characterization of the rule of the "ancients." Bodin,
in fact, appears to reject the rule of the jus soli: "For the place
maketh not the child of a stranger (man or woman) to be a citizen:
and he that was born in Africk of two Roman citizens is no less a
citizen, than if he had been born in Rome."327
On the other hand, Bodin would recognize a rule of the jus soli for
a child born in another country of a French parent, if the parent had
"expressly renounced the place of his birth":3
As whether a Spaniard born and brought up in Spain, and yet the
son of a French man (which French man had always dwelt in
Spain, and expressly renounced the place of his birth) being come
into France there to make his perpetual residence, ought to enjoy
the privileges of a citizen, without letters of his naturalizing?
Nevertheless I am of opinion that he is a stranger, for the reasons
before alleged, and that he ought not to enjoy the privilege of a
citizen, saving unto the prince to reform it if it shall so seem
good unto him.329
Although Bodin's discussion of the acquisition of citizenship by
birth was not a primary concern of his Republique, Bodin's writings
concerning the nature of sovereignty nonetheless resolved the
problem of mutual citizenship within a "commonwealth" of diverse
laws. Because Bodin defined citizenship as subjection to a sovereign,
maintaining that sovereignty by its very existence had a claim to the
325. RIESENBERG, supra note 79, at 223 (translating Bodin). See also BODIN, supra note 10,
at 57, 64-65.
326. See BODrN, supra note 10, at 49.
327. Id.
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subject's obedience,3" Bodin's definition did not require any man-
made law of allegiance. Therefore, various groups of subjects with
peculiar laws or local customs were related through subjection to a
common sovereign:
Wherefore of many citizens, be they naturals, or naturalized, or
else slaves enfranchised (which are the three means that the law
giveth to become a citizen by) is made a Commonwealth, when
they are governed by the puissant sovereignty [the single
sovereign power] of one or many rulers: albeit that they differ
among themselves in laws, language, customs, religions, and
diversity of nations.331
For Bodin, the reciprocal obligation of citizen (or subject) and
sovereign was grounded in the "laws of God and nature., 3 2 The
problem and resolution in Calvin's Case was similar, but without the
explicit recognition that, for the postnati at least, the two kingdoms of
England and Scotland had to some degree become the "common-
wealth" Bodin described, while retaining a "diversity of laws,
language, customs, [and] religion." '333
Interestingly, Richard Knolles's preface to the English translation,
completed in 1606, provides some insight into Knolles's interest in
Bodin:
But to find out a good and reasonable means, whereby such mul-
titudes of people, so far differing in quality, estate, and condition,
and so hardly to be governed, might yet into one body politic be
in such sort united, as that every one of them should in their de-
gree, together with the common good (as members of one and
the self-same natural body) ... [is] so hard and difficult a
matter[.] Yet of this so few have written[.] These six books of
Jean Bodin ... orderly and exactly prosecute all forms and
fashions of commonwealths, with the good and evil.., and many
other matters and questions most necessary to be known for the
maintenance and preservation of them.3 4
From Knolles's preface, though he did not mention explicitly the issue
of the status of Scots in England, one can conclude two things: First,
that the regal union of the two kingdoms engendered new political
questions concerning the status of subjects of the two kingdoms; and
330. See id. at 84-85, 88-89, 92.
331. Id. at 49. The parenthetical inserted above is a translation from the 1955 M.J. Tooley
edition. See BODIN, Tooley Edition, supra note 324, at 19-20.
332. BODIN, supra note 10, at 92.
333. Id. at 49.
334. Richard Knolles, Introduction to BODIN, supra note 10, at iv-v.
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second, that these political questions may have prompted his transla-
tion.
Thus, in 1608, the litigants and judges considering Calvin's Case
were not working in a vacuum of political and legal thought on the
problem of the postnati. The municipal law practiced in France, as
well as the writings of the commentators of the Corpus juris civilis,
pointed to the conclusion that naturalization of subjects born outside
of a territory must be by charter or by statute. Even English
precedent arguably pointed to this conclusion, at least for the antenati.
On the other hand, the unique contribution of Craig and Bodin was
that they also concluded that mutual naturalization could occur apart
from charter or statute because of natural law and the obligations of
allegiance owed by all of a monarch's subjects. Under the feudal law,
allegiance was a prerequisite for holding land in the King's territory.
E. A Synthesis
James's union plans sparked a wide-ranging search for a legal
solution to the question of which persons were entitled to the rights
and entitlements of English law. Civil lawyers contributed to the
substantial literature on the union of the laws of the two kingdoms,
and the Commissioners of Union included civilians as well as common
lawyers. The opposition faction in the Commons looked to civilians
for examples of how other legal systems resolved the question of
kingdoms united by descent. One civilian, John Bennet, perhaps
inadvertently made a substantial contribution to the strength of the
defendants' challenge in Calvin's Case. Bennet's maxim was incor-
porated into the theory of the King's two bodies, making this theory
a viable challenge because it now fit the ad fidem Regis formulation
of the statute De Natis and Cobledike's Case. Contemporaries claimed
that there was no example from civil law to further the resolution of
Calvin's Case, but the introduction of the maxim cum duo jura into
the debate about the nature of the King's sovereignty was a powerful
concept, and the maxim was accepted with little discussion concerning
its source in civil law.
Coke and Bacon turned to higher law to defeat the challenge from
the Commons. Bacon maintained that the King's body politic had no
place in the resolution of the lawsuit. Coke, on the other hand, did
not completely repudiate the defendants' claim that the King's body
politic was relevant to the question of who was a subject and who was
an alien. The political writings of Craig and Bodin show that other
legal thinkers outside of England had previously offered solutions
similar to Coke's resolution of the case. The most striking similarity
is that, in the absence of a statute enacted specifically to establish the
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legal status of the postnati, Bacon, Coke, and Craig arrived at the
same rule: Place of birth in a territory within the King's dominion
made one a natural-born subject in all of the King's lands.
For Craig, the issue was to be determined according to the jus
feudale-Craig arrived at this rule without reference to the English
precedent discussed in Calvin's Case.335 Bacon and Coke, on the
other hand, found the basis for determining natural-born status not in
a general jus feudale predating or underlying English common law but
as a matter of natural law. Nonetheless, the results were the same.
Contemporaries viewed the jus feudale as part of the "civil" law. 336
If Bacon derived any of his arguments concerning the legal status of
the postnati from Craig's writings, he certainly had an incentive to
replace Craig's source of the rule in the "jus feudale" with the "law
of nature" because of Coke's general resistance to "foreign laws [and]
alien precedents., 337 Moreover, Bacon had directly experienced the
hostility of common lawyers to his calls for a union of the laws of
Scotland and England, a hostility based largely upon the general
perception that Scotland had a civil-law system.338
Nonetheless, a feudal conception of "ligeance" was at the heart of
Bacon's (and later, Coke's) arguments concerning how it was that
allegiance to the same sovereign brought about mutual naturalization
in Scotland and England. Coke looked to English statutes referring to
the monarch as "natural liege lord" for evidence that one's allegiance
was due by the law of nature.339 Craig looked to the mutuality of
loyalty and protection resulting from the oath of fealty, as well as to
the feudal assumption that one could not give homage to more than
one lord, to determine that allegiance to the King as "liege sovereign"
was the same in Scotland as in England.3"
Furthermore, some aspects of Coke's reasoning in Calvin's Case
appear similar to Bodin's theories of sovereignty contained in the
Republique. Bodin, even though he most likely would have rejected
a rule of the jus soli, would probably have reached the same result as
Coke: Because the law of nature required a subject's allegiance, and
335. See CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 339.
336. See, e.g, THOMAS RIDLEY, A VIEW OF THE CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 68
(Oxford, H. Hall for Richard Davis 1607) (classifying jus feudale as fourth "tome" of civil law).
The situation in which Ridley published his book is described in Daniel Coquillette, Legal
Ideology and Incorporation I1: Sir Thomas Ridley, Charles Molloy, and the Literary Battle for
the Law Merchant, 1607-1676, 61 B.U. L. REV. 315, 336-40 (1981).
337. See Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 381 (K.B. 1608).
338. See LEVACK, FORMATION, supra note 28, at 85-89.
339. 77 Eng. Rep. at 382-83.
340. See CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 335-36, 339-40; CRAIG, Jus FEUDALE, supra
note 305, at 774.
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the law of nature was the same in Scotland and in England, differen-
ces in the municipal laws of the two countries were irrelevant to
determine citizenship. In particular, Bodin's discussion of the "liege
fealty and homage" aspect of sovereignt3 41 looks like Coke's
natural law--one did not look to customary law for the source of this
obligation. For both Bodin and Coke, something beyond the reach of
customary or municipal law determined who was a subject. Bodin
reached this result even though he defined the "principal point of
sovereign majesty, and absolute power, to consist principally in giving
laws unto the subjects in general, without their consent.,'3 41 Coke
would vehemently disagree with this statement if this meant the King
alone had such absolute power.
The second area in which Bodin's Republique resonates with Coke's
resolution of Calvin's Case is Bodin's emphasis on a mutuality of
obligation between sovereign and subject. Bodin proposed that divine
and natural law imposed certain concrete limitations on sovereigns,
much like Coke's formulation of the mutual obligations of allegiance
constraining the royal prerogative. For Bodin, because sovereigns
were the source of all positive law, sovereignty was not subject to
human limitations. Nonetheless, sovereigns were subject to God and
the law of nature, though there was no jurisdiction on earth in which
to prosecute a sovereign's violation of divine or natural law, because
the King was also head of the church in his domain.343
Coke, too, emphasized the reciprocal obligations between sovereign
and subject, but the sovereign's obligations were vague, undefined,
and seemingly fairly limited: "But between the Sovereign and the
subject there is without comparison a higher and greater connexion:
for as the subject oweth to the King his true and faithful ligeance and
obedience, so the sovereign is to govern and protect his subjects."3"
Although Coke would not agree that James was the exclusive source
of law for England, in Calvin's Case, Coke did rely on the mutual
obligations due by the law of nature as a limiting principle, at least in
theory, on the King's exercise of sovereignty. In fact, the notion that
the King by the law of nature owed certain duties to his subjects
marks a point of divergence between Bacon's position and Coke's
resolution of the case. Nonetheless, both Coke and Bodin articulate
unified notions of sovereignty that extend beyond feudal relations. 345
341. See BODIN, supra note 10, at 175.
342. Id. at 98.
343. Id. at 84-113, 153-74.
344. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382 (K.B. 1608).
345. Compare BODIN, supra note 10, at 114-15, with Coke's statements in Calvin's Case, 77
Eng. Rep. at 388-89, 391.
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VI. EPILOGUE: THE ORIGINS OF U.S. BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
We in the United States often take the rule of the jus soli,
incorporated into our Fourteenth Amendment, for granted. Is that
because we have known little of its origin? The most remarkable
aspect of Calvin's Case is how a politically charged legal question
perplexed many of the most important English lawyers of the early
seventeenth century. The English justices encountered a hurdle in
resolving Robert Calvin's status in line with past precedent. This
hurdle was the result of unsettled ideas of sovereignty-a challenge
that grew from the larger, unique political situation. Would
nineteenth-century jurists in the United States have adopted the rule
of Calvin's Case but for the historical accident of the union of the
Scottish and English crowns in 1603? Coke's doctrine tying allegiance
to the natural body of the King was archaic even by the end of the
eighteenth century and should never have had even theoretical
significance in the former colonies. When one considers Calvin's Case
in the detail it deserves, it is plain that the importance placed upon
territory of birth was not logically, politically, or historically
inevitable.
The larger debate of immigration reform has kindled the interest
of scholars in the development of territorial birthright citizenship
during the early history of the United States."4 A rule of birthright
citizenship to determine legal status has been part of American law
for a long time. Until the late nineteenth century in the United States,
however, the common law-not a statute or a constitutional
provision-was the source of the rule of territorial birthright
citizenship. In 1830, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the rule in the
following manner: "Nothing is better settled at the common law than
the doctrine that the children even of aliens born in a country, while
the parents are resident there under the protection of the government,
and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth."347
346. The seminal work on the subject to date is JAMES H. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-1870 (1978). More recently, contributions have come from T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 9 (1990); Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution,
and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667 (1996);
Gary C. Leedes, Rediscovering the Link Between the Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Citizenship Declaration, 26 IND. L. REV. 469 (1993); William Piatt, Born as
Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 35 (1988); Robert J. Shulman, Comment, Children of a Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth
Amendment Be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to
American-Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 669 (1995).
347. Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 164 (1830) (emphasis
added). The case considered whether a citizen might expatriate himself without sanction of the
[Vol. 9: 73
66
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol9/iss1/2
1997]
Equating the ancient English term "subjects" with "citizens," the
Court stated unambiguously that, as a matter of common law,
acquisition of birthright status by children of aliens was dependent
solely upon the circumstance of birth within the territorial boundaries
of a government.
34
For nineteenth-century courts in the United States, Calvin's Case
more than any other source of law had settled the rule.349 Calvin's
Case was well known in the early history of the United States because
of its inclusion in the standard treatises of the day-Coke's Reports,
Blackstone's Commentaries,5 ° and later, in the Commentaries of
James Kent.351 In 1827, Chancellor Kent stated: "The distinctions [in
Calvin's Case], in reference to our revolution, have been frequently
the subject of judicial discussion since the establishment of our
independence.,352 The United States Supreme Court considered
Calvin's Case on five occasions prior to 1868, 353 but state court uses
of Calvin's Case constituted the primary transformation of Calvin's
Case from a rule to determine the status of subjects who owed
allegiance to a king, to one about citizenship in the American
republic.31
As a pronouncement of the common law, the determination of U.S.
citizenship by birth paralleled and was, indeed, derived directly from
state, in a question of land ownership by a child born in New York prior to 1783 of Irish
parents. One author has noted that the case "manifestly had settled nothing, and the great
question as to the right of expatriation was unresolved." Charles Gordon, The Citizen and the
State: The Power of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315, 321-22 (1965).
348. See 28 U.S. at 156.
349. See id. at 164; U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,656 (1898). See generally KETTNER,
supra note 29, at 65-105.
350. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *354-63.
351. 2 KENT, supra note 49, at 49-52.
352. Id. at 49.
353. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830); The Venus, 12
U.S. (14 Cranch) 253 (1814); Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey, 8 U.S. (8 Cranch) 321 (1808);
Lambert's Lessee v. Paine, 7 U.S. 97 (1805); M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 6 U.S. (5 Cranch) 280
(1805). Lower federal courts also referenced Calvin's Case. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes,
27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151); Case of Williams, 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C. Conn. 1799)
(No. 17,708).
354. See, e.g., State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 20, 24-26 (1838) ("The term 'citi-
zen,' as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term 'subject' in the common law,
and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty
has been transferred from the man to the collective body of the people; and he who before was
a 'subject of the king' is now 'a citizen of the state'."); Gardner v. Ward (1805), reprinted in
Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 236, 244-45 n.(a) (1806) ("[A] man, born within the jurisdic-
tion of the common law, is a citizen of the country wherein he is born. By this circumstance of
his birth, he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which is claimed and enforced by the
sovereign of his native land; and becomes reciprocally entitled to the protection of that
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the treatment of subjects and aliens in the common law of England.
At its starting point, citizenship in the United States in 1790 was
defined by state common law.35 Although the first federal statute
on naturalization was passed in 1790,356 it merely supplemented
existing state common-law definitions of citizenship. In fact, there was
no federal definition of citizenship by birth in the United States until
1868, when for the first time a constitutional definition of citizenship
through the Fourteenth Amendment imposed uniformity throughout
the states.3 7 Even then, the common-law rule articulated in Calvin's
Case became the basis for the view that the intention of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment must have been to constituti-
onalize birthright citizenship.358 In 1928, a comment in the Harvard
Law Review stated the present-day rule of birthright citizenship in the
United States: "[i1t seems safe to say that the same rule would be
applied to children born to aliens temporarily within the country, no
matter how short their stay. ' 35
9
The constitutional development of the law of citizenship in the
United States has been considered with some frequency, including the
355. The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example, naturalized and enfranchised aliens until
the 1840s. In 1844, Congress debated whether the Commonwealth of Virginia could naturalize
aliens to create U.S. citizenship for purposes of voting in elections to the U.S. Congress. A
"large majority" of the House committee were of the following opinion:
[Als the power of the Federal Government "to enact uniform laws upon the subject of
naturalization" is, when exercised, exclusive, the statutes of Virginia prescribing an oath
of fidelity of the Commonwealth, and declaring the mode in which persons shall become
citizens of Virginia, are merely void; and that such persons, although treated by the laws
of Virginia as citizens, cannot exercise the right of suffrage for members of the House of
Representatives ....
H.R. REP. NO. 28-520, at 3 (1844).
356. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (repealed 1795). U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 4 provides that Congress shall have power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization." Most scholars agree that the power granted to Congress by this section was
limited to defining under what circumstances birth outside of the territorial United States would
result in the rights of a natural-born citizen. See FREDERICK VAN DYNE, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF NATURALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1907) (noting that naturalization of
foreigners was power expressly reserved to federal government); Note, Constitutional Limitations
on the Power of Congress to Confer Citizenship by Naturalization, 50 IOWA L. REV. 1093, 1094
(1965) (noting that art. I, § 8 arose out of concern for lack of uniformity between state laws
regarding who was alien and who was naturalized citizen).
357. Citizenship acquired by birth in the United States is granted not by Congress but by
the 14th Amendment. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 249 (1964) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment ... makes every person who is born here a citizen.") (Douglas, J., concurring); see
also Michael T. Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 1007, 1044 (1976)
("Congressional power over citizenship is limited by the naturalization clause and the first
sentence of the fourteenth amendment."); Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause
and Presidential Eligibility, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 892 n.65 (1988) ("Citizenship acquired by birth
in the United States is granted by the 14th Amendment itself, not by Congress.").
358. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); In re Look Tin Sing,
21 F. 905 (9th Cir. 1884).
359. Comment, Citizenship by Birth, 41 HARV. L. REV. 643,644 (1928).
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Dred Scott decision and its aftermath.3" What is less well known are
the origins of the earlier, unique form of citizenship by birth
developed in the common law. The few historians who have pursued
these origins have rightly emphasized the precedential value of Coke's
report of Calvin's Case in the American colonies,3 6t as well as its
place in constitutional development during the Stuart period in
England. 62 The foundations of Calvin's Case, however, have not
previously received adequate attention. Scholars have not looked
much behind the reports of Calvin's Case to consider the sources of
the rule announced by the judges in 1608. This Article may begin to
fill this gap.
Courts in the early United States adopted tenets of Calvin's Case
for quite complex reasons, but primarily the appeal of the rule of the
jus soli articulated in Calvin's Case was two-fold. The most important
factor in the transfer of the doctrine of territorial birthright citizenship
from the Old World to the new was that the early Republic did not
create a federal definition of citizenship, leaving the determination of
citizenship to individual states. The federal constitution distinguished
between citizens and "natural-born" citizens,3'6 but it did not specify
criteria for determining the difference between them.36" And while
both states and the federal government enacted legislation for natural-
ization in the immediate aftermath of the revolution,3" there was no
immediate necessity for a rule determining citizenship at birth. As a
result, only gradually did courts face the question of whether persons
born within the territorial United States after the revolution were
automatically to be considered citizens.
360. See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); KETrNER, supra note 29, at
307-33; Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369
(1973).
361. See, e.g., KETrNER, supra note 29, at 65-105; Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of
Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157, 1175-76 (1976); Robert J. Steinfeld,
Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 347-48 (1989).
362. See, e.g., DONALD W. HANSON, FROM KINGDOM TO COMMONWEALTH: THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF CIVIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT 313-15 (1970).
363. Compare U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall
not have ... been seven Years a Citizen of the United States."), with art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("No
Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of the President.").
364. There exists a large literature on this issue, some of it cited previously in this Article.
In 1898, the U.S. Supreme Court validated the long-held view that the common-law principles
familiar to the Framers were to determine this issue, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649, 655 (1898) ("The constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens.
Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that.").
365. See generally FRANK GEORGE FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1969); Polly J. Price, Term Limits on Original
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Chancellor Kent wrote under the comprehensive title of "aliens"
and "natives":
Natives are all persons born within the jurisdiction and allegiance
of the United States. This is the rule of the common law, without
any regard or reference to the political condition or allegiance of
their parents, with the exception of the children of ambassadors,
who are, in theory, born within the allegiance of the foreign
power they represent.
•. And if, at common law, all human beings born within the
ligeance of the king, and under the King's obedience, were
natural-born subjects, and not aliens, I do not perceive why this
doctrine does not apply to these United States in all cases in
which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to
the contrary?6
6
Coke's report of Calvin's Case emphatically placed acquisition of
birthright status in the realm of the law of nature. For all the ambiva-
lence in legal thought in the early United States concerning the role
of natural law, for a time at least, Calvin's Case settled the issue into
a rule of common law.
Second, an equally important explanation for the status accorded
Calvin's Case in the new Republic is that jurists saw parallels between
the question of who was to be a citizen in the new American Republic
and the questions raised by the status of the Scottish postnati. After
1776, legal thinkers needed a working definition of who was to be
included in the citizenry of the former colonies. Likewise, because
Calvin's Case turned on a distinction based on the union of the
crowns in 1603, the Scottish postnati had many similarities to post-
Revolutionary inhabitants of the new United States.
3 67
The subsequent uses of Calvin's Case in the United States remind
us that in legal history it is often difficult to understand the power of
an idea unleashed in an era with which we are largely unfamiliar
without some appreciation for the later importance of the story. The
importance of Calvin's Case in the early history of the United States
is accounted for in part by the fact that it permitted courts to resolve
questions of citizenship status in the absence of any statutory or
constitutional authority on the subject. In 1830, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced that no rule was "better settled" in the common law
than the rule of acquisition of citizenship by birth. Yet just twenty-
366. 2 KENT, supra note 81, at 39, 42 n.258.
367. From Kent, we know that "[t]he distinctions between the antenati and the postnati, in
reference to our revolution, have been frequently the subject of judicial discussion since the
establishment of our independence." Id. at 49.
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seven years later, in the famous case of the freed slave Dred
Scott,3" the Supreme Court would disregard the settled common-
law rule in favor of a rule for federal citizenship which derived from
pedigree and ancestry. For black inhabitants, at least, Dred Scott
invoked a rule more akin to the jus sanguinis, while the rule of
territorial birthright citizenship appears to have been a settled rule for
white inhabitants.
A lasting contribution of Calvin's Case was to equate the legal
status of "subject" with a specially privileged class of persons, those
entitled to hold land in England, but at the same time to award that
status solely by the criteria of birth within a territory. The subsequent
importance of Calvin's Case in the early history of the United States
is therefore ironic in its deviation from this essentially egalitarian
origin. American citizenship throughout the nineteenth century, a
matter of state law from its inception, was concerned with and divided
into various levels of political participation. While white women could
be and probably were considered citizens in most states, they had few
political and legal rights. Slaves, Native Americans, and even free
people of color were entirely excluded during most of the nineteenth
century.369 The existence of a rule of the jus soli alongside these
divisions in the various states diverged radically from its origin to
determine only the duties and benefits of allegiance, not the political
rights that would accompany it.
Of this later story, we credit the contradiction of slavery. Calvin's
Case was decided in an essentially monolithic racial context. Thomas
Craig wrote in 1605:
368. In Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
black inhabitants of the United States were not "citizens" within the meaning of the federal
constitution, despite whatever classification a state may choose to give them, and despite Justice
Curtis's declaration: "Undoubtedly .... it is a principle of public law, recognized by the
Constitution itself, that birth on the soil of a country both creates the duties and confers the
rights of citizenship." Id. at 578 (Curtis, J., dissenting). In Dred Scott, the Court deviated from
the received and "settled" rule of birthright citizenship based upon territory, the legacy of
Calvin's Case, in favor of a rule in which national citizenship derived from pedigree and
ancestry. The race question marked the only substantial divergence from the rule of territorial
birth announced in Calvin's Case in U.S. history.
369. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), Justice Johnson, in dissent,
appeared to recognize that Calvin's Case also determined the citizen or alien status of Indians,
but that, too, was an issue of state law: "And if not citizens, they must be aliens or foreigners,
and such must be the character of each individual belonging to the nation... . The Indians,
though born within our territorial limits, are considered as born under the dominion of their own
tribes." Id. at 66, 68 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Justice Johnson noted that Chancellor Kent had
reached the same result in Jackson v. Goodel, 20 Johns. 187, 193 (N.Y. 1822) ("In my view they
have never been regarded as citizens, or members of our body politic. They have always been,
and still are, considered by our laws as dependent tribes, governed by their own usages and
chiefs; but placed under our protection, and subject to our coercion so far as the public safety
required it, and no farther."). Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 66 (citing Jackson).
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As to persons, slavery, and even the name of it, has ceased
throughout all Christian states, and at the present day no master
has power of life and death over his servant, the King being the
sole disposer of the life and limb of his subjects .... Of slavery
there is no trace among us therefore. Our neighbors, however,
still retain certain survivals of slavery in the plantations, in those
whom they call natives .... With that exception there are no
slaves in any nation.37
The absence of slavery within the British isles meant that Coke in
Calvin's Case had no need to distinguish between classes of sub-
jects-all persons born within the King's territories were subjects by
virtue of the circumstances of their birth.
The surprising point, then, is that the rule of the jus soli established
by Calvin's Case was adopted and continued in the early history of
the United States, at a time when, politically, no one intended to
accord equal citizenship rights solely on the basis of birth within the
territory. The racial mix of the American territories created a
disjuncture between national status and citizenship rights, finally
constitutionalized through the Fourteenth Amendment as one step to
solve the problem of citizenship created by Dred Scott.371 Bodin, in
Republique, was emphatic that citizenship was a status only for free
subjects. 72 Coke, in developing the rule of the jus soli in Calvin's
Case, had no occasion to discuss the distinctions, if any, between the
King's subjects who were "free" and those who were not. And
although the topic cannot be explored fully here, in the United States,
I would argue, the two-century history of the rule of the jus soli, at
common law and later in the Fourteenth Amendment, is further
evidence that there were, in fact, two American Revolutions.373 The
second Revolution, the American Civil War, ushered in a
constitutionalized federal rule of birthright citizenship.
Finally, Calvin's Case and its aftermath illustrate the tenacity of a
legal doctrine accorded "natural law" status in the late medieval
period, long after the political and social situation prompting its
370. CRAIG, DE UNIONE, supra note 9, at 306-07.
371. Native Americans, however, were not extended territorial birthright citizenship until
this century, in the Citizenship Act of 1924. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1994). This act made
them natural-born citizens of the United States irrespective of their desire in the matter. Native
Americans were excluded from the reach of section one of the 14th Amendment on the theory
that they were a separate sovereignty, a dependent sovereign nation within the territorial United
States. See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
841, 854 (1990).
372. See BODIN, supra note 10, at 48.
373. On one aspect of the shift in federalism brought about by the Civil War, see Price,
supra note 365, at 523, 527.
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formulation changed. Calvin's Case, born of natural law in a feudal
system, was the bridge for adoption of the jus soli in the United
States. Courts in the early United States firmly grasped Calvin's Case
and used it precisely to define the relationship of allegiance owing by
birth. Perhaps because jurists in the early history of the United States
misunderstood the inherent limitations of its context, Chancellor Kent
could say of Calvin's Case: "I do not perceive why this doctrine does
not apply to these United States in all cases in which there is no
express constitutional or statute declaration to the contrary."374
Scholars who address the question of how the jus soli came to be a
common-law rule in the early United States, I predict, will ultimately
conclude that the explanation lies somewhere in the fact that Calvin's
Case imbued birthright citizenship with the status of natural law.
If legal history is to be thought of instrumentally, it is best used to
inform, but not to direct, present action. What this history has told us
is that policy justifications used today to support the rule of birthright
citizenship are far different from those of its origin, but they are,
perhaps, no less explicitly goal-oriented. In 1608, the rule of
obedience and allegiance required of a subject at birth was a self-
serving policy for a monarchy at a time when few other compulsions
existed. The cost of a rule determining that all persons born within
the King's territories were subjects at birth was low because few
benefits were tied to that allegiance. Today, by contrast, most nations,
including particularly the United States, have radically expanded the
benefits tied to the status of citizen. Current legislation restricting
rights and benefits of illegal aliens is driven by a changed sense of the
balance between what an individual owes to the state and what the
state owes to the individual. Great Britain, the nation that gave birth
to Calvin's Case, has now abandoned that rule, but only after nearly
four centuries of following it. The remaining question is whether, as
a legal practice and as a political idea, the U.S. rule of birthright
citizenship will survive without the divine sanction it once enjoyed as
a product of natural law.
374. 2 KENT, supra note 81, at 42, n.258.
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